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Abstract 
 
This paper studies cross-sectional determinants of the exposure of U.K. firms to Brexit, an 
event which resulted in an unprecedented rise in political uncertainty. We find that 
internationalization has a moderating effect on Brexit exposure which goes beyond the pure 
currency translation effect and is consistent with international activities acting as a 
diversification mechanism for domestic risks. We also provide some indicative evidence that 
high-growth firms are more affected by Brexit. At the industry level, we show that Financials 
and firms in the consumer-facing sectors have the highest exposure to Brexit-related 
uncertainty. Knowledge of the variation in exposure of individual firms and sectors to political 
uncertainty associated with major political events can assist managers, investors and 
policymakers in taking remedial actions to limit its impact. 
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“Economics, policy and politics have already taken so many surprising turns in 
recent years that we believe the only certainty we have is uncertainty.” 
Valentijn van Nieuwenhuijzen, Head of Strategy at NN Investment Partners, 
cited in the Financial Times (March 27, 2016) 
 
1. Introduction 
On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted for Brexit – withdrawal from the 
European Union (E.U.) – and this paper analyzes the extent to which individual British 
companies are exposed to this event. The analysis allows us to get insights into a broader and 
increasingly important issue: characteristics of individual firms that determine their exposure 
to uncertainty associated with political events. The Brexit vote, followed shortly by the 
unexpected election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States, lifted political 
uncertainty around the world to unprecedented levels (Davis, 2016), yet we know surprisingly 
little about how this uncertainty affects different firms and industries. Academic literature 
documents that uncertainty associated with, for example, elections or global summits, affects 
stock prices at the aggregate level (e.g. Bialkowski et al., 2008; Pastor and Veronesi, 2013; 
Brogaard and Detzel, 2015; Kelly et al., 2016), however it is reasonable to expect that some 
firms are more affected than others. Understanding the variation in the exposure of individual 
firms to Brexit, and to political uncertainty more generally, is important to allow corporate 
managers to prepare for and mitigate its impact, to allow investors to manage their exposure to 
individual firms or sectors when political uncertainty is high, and to allow policymakers to 
understand where the effects of uncertainty are likely to be felt most. 
The impact of the Brexit vote on businesses is complex but we posit that, above all, 
Brexit is an event associated with heightened political uncertainty, as defined in the earlier 
theoretical finance literature. Pastor and Veronesi (2012) identify political uncertainty as 
uncertainty about whether the prevailing government policy will change.1 Similarly, Pastor and 
Veronesi (2013) broadly interpret political uncertainty as “uncertainty about the government’s 
future actions” (page 521).2 The context of Brexit fits such a notion very well and therefore the 
Brexit referendum provides a unique and particularly interesting setup to study political 
                                                          
1 Pastor and Veronesi (2012) identify so defined political uncertainty as one of the elements of government policy 
uncertainty. The other element is impact uncertainty which refers to uncertainty about the impact of a new 
government policy on firms’ profitability. 
2 In the model in Pastor and Veronesi (2013), investors react to the flow of political news (political shocks) on the 
basis of which they update their beliefs about the likelihood of the adoption of various government policies in the 
future. Political shocks are orthogonal to fundamental economic shocks affecting the supply of aggregate capital 
and beliefs about the impact of the current government policy. 
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uncertainty. Unlike parliamentary or presidential elections in which debates focus on selected 
policies, such as taxation or healthcare, consequences of the Brexit referendum are wide-
reaching, affecting many government policies that shape the environment in which British 
companies operate. For example, the decision to leave the E.U. is associated with uncertainty 
about the U.K.’s future legal and regulatory framework which is currently driven by E.U. laws 
and regulations, and it leads to uncertainty about the U.K.’s international trading agreements 
and immigration policies.3 Not surprisingly, in the months around the referendum, the news-
based U.K. economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016) sharply increased, far 
exceeding the levels it reached during the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the Eurozone crisis 
of 2011-2012.4 
To measure a firm’s exposure to Brexit uncertainty we use stock market data from the 
pre-referendum period and from around the referendum result day.5 We estimate two 
alternative measures of Brexit exposure. First, we estimate it as the link between the firm’s 
daily stock returns and changes in the probability of a leave (Brexit) vote calculated from 
bookmakers’ odds over four months of the referendum campaign. Second, we apply a standard 
event study approach and measure the firm’s stock price reaction to the referendum result. We 
find a high degree of correspondence between the two measures of Brexit exposure. For both 
measures we find a large cross-firm variation which indicates that individual companies are 
differently exposed to the uncertainty associated with Brexit. We then explore this variation in 
a set of cross-sectional tests. 
We are particularly interested in the effect of the firm’s internationalization on its Brexit 
exposure. Our primary measure of a firm’s internationalization is the number of foreign 
countries mentioned in its annual report but our results hold when we measure it via foreign 
sales or foreign assets. We find that more internationally-oriented firms are less affected by the 
                                                          
3 The complexity of Brexit-related political uncertainties that U.K. companies face can be illustrated by the 
following statement in the Principal Risks section of the 2017 Annual Report of Rolls-Royce Plc (page 59): “While 
we wait for political certainty from the Brexit negotiations and details of the final Brexit deal, we have assessed 
potential additional operational impacts to understand what action Rolls-Royce might need to take before Brexit 
occurs in 2019. We could be impacted through a number of routes. For example: our regulatory relationship with 
the EU (European Aviation Safety Agency; REACH chemical certification programme); our operational 
relationship (customs union and movement of people); our tax and treasury strategy; our EU R&T funding 
relationship and other interfaces.” 
4 The index reached between 429 and 479 points during the referendum campaign in March-May, 800 points in 
June and an all-time-high of 1,142 points in July 2016. During the financial crisis of 2007-2008 it reached a 
maximum of 251 points in October 2008, and during the Eurozone crisis of 2011-2012 the maximum was 408 
points in November 2012. The long-term average monthly value of the index between January 1997 and June 
2017 is 161 points. The index is available at www.policyuncertainty.com. 
5 As Estrella and Mishkin (1998) argue, beyond forecasting accuracy, employment of leading financial indicators, 
such as the stock market, “allows the economic analyst to think about the causal relationships that may lead to a 
specific result” (page 45). 
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uncertainties of Brexit. Our finding is consistent with diversification benefits of international 
activities; companies can diversify domestic risks and hence reduce their negative impact by 
operating internationally, assuming that risks are not perfectly correlated across countries (e.g. 
Shapiro, 1978; Fatemi, 1984; Kwok and Reeb, 2000; Beaulieu et al., 2005). We rule out the 
possibility that our result is solely driven by the effect of the weaker pound (GBP) in response 
to Brexit, which increased the pound-denominated value of foreign sales or assets. The 
diversification benefits of internationalization appear to dominate the impact of uncertainty 
regarding foreign trade agreements or regulations, important issues related to Brexit, which 
would be expected to adversely affect firms with international operations (e.g., Boutchkova et 
al., 2012; Handley and Limao, 2015).  
To further test the diversification effect, we divide international exposure into European 
and non-European. In line with the expectation that Brexit effects are likely to ripple through 
the rest of Europe, we find that European exposure provides a weaker diversification 
mechanism, and the beneficial effect of internationalization is driven by non-European 
exposure. We confirm that the statistically significant effect of internationalization on how 
companies are affected by Brexit-related uncertainties does not capture the effect of firm size 
or industry-specific effects since the results hold after controlling for them.  
In the cross-sectional analysis we also explore the impact of the firm’s growth and 
investment opportunities on its Brexit exposure. We find some evidence that growth firms are 
more exposed to Brexit uncertainties, in line with our expectation, however our results allow 
us to draw indicative rather than definitive conclusions.6 We base our expectation that growth 
firms are more exposed to Brexit uncertainties on theoretical arguments (e.g., Bernanke, 1983; 
Aizenman and Marion, 1993; Bloom, 2009; Pastor and Veronesi, 2012) and empirical evidence 
(e.g. Julio and Yook, 2012; Baker et al, 2016; Hassan et al., 2016) that firms cut investment 
and reduce employment when political uncertainty increases. Growing firms and firms with 
greater investment opportunities are likely to require uninterrupted investment in physical and 
human capital to exploit those opportunities, and therefore these firms would have a larger 
exposure to political uncertainty. 
Among the control variables we find that larger firms are more affected by Brexit and 
we also provide some evidence that more profitable firms have lower exposure. Other 
fundamental firm characteristics, such as leverage and liquidity, are insignificant. Furthermore, 
                                                          
6 The significance of individual empirical proxies depends on the measure of Brexit exposure and regression 
specification. 
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we find no significant link between Brexit exposure and foreign ownership, reliance on the 
European Single Market7 workforce, labor intensity or the extent of E.U. lobbying. 
The industry-level analysis reveals that Financials and firms in the Consumer Goods 
and Consumer Services sectors have the highest Brexit exposure. There are alternative channels 
through which Brexit uncertainties could translate to higher Brexit exposure for financial firms. 
First, politically-induced uncertainty leads to weaker future overall economic conditions (e.g. 
Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2015; Baker et al., 2016) which negatively affects profitability of 
banks and other financial institutions. Second, U.K. financial firms are affected by the 
uncertainty regarding international agreements on access to foreign markets, including 
passporting rights which allow financial firms based and regulated in one European Economic 
Area (E.E.A.) country to operate freely in any other E.E.A. country. The high Brexit exposure 
of consumer-facing companies is in line with evidence that households reduce consumption 
and increase savings in periods of higher policy uncertainty (Giavazzi and McMahon, 2012). 
Firms in the Basic Materials and Healthcare sectors have the lowest exposure to Brexit 
uncertainties. Companies in those sectors are mainly multinational firms with operations 
diversified across countries and are less dependent on domestic market conditions. Our 
empirical analysis suggests that the sector-wide effect reflects the aggregation of the benefits 
of international diversification at the level of individual firms. 
This paper complements existing studies which examine the impact of similar single 
political events on stocks: Beaulieu et al. (2005) analyze the 1995 Quebec independence 
referendum and Acker and Duck (2015) the 2014 Scottish independence referendum.8 Our 
setting and sample allow a more comprehensive analysis of political uncertainty exposure at 
the level of the individual firm than these existing studies. The limited exposure of U.K. firms 
to the Scottish independence referendum restricts the ability of Acker and Duck (2015) to 
explore cross-sectional variation in exposure, and Beaulieu et al. (2005) analyze portfolios of 
stocks across a relatively limited sample of 71 firms. Our regressions are run at the firm level 
on a much larger sample of almost 300 companies, which also improves the power of our test 
statistics. The firm-level analysis in this paper also complements a study by Boutchkova et al. 
(2012) who provide a cross-country, industry-level analysis of political risk exposure. They 
find that higher political risk leads to greater return volatility for industries more dependent on 
                                                          
7 See Appendix A for definitions. 
8 The link between the behavior of financial markets and changing probabilities of a single election outcome is 
also analyzed by Gemmill (1992) for the U.K. 1987 parliamentary elections, and Knight (2006), Snowberg et al. 
(2007) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2016) for the U.S. presidential elections in 2000, 2004 and 2016, respectively. 
6 
 
foreign trade, contract enforcement and labor. The findings of Boutchkova et al. (2012) in 
respect of foreign trade contrast with those of Beaulieu et al. (2005), who find that firms with 
international exposure are less affected by political risk than firms without international 
exposure. We offer new evidence on these contradictory findings; we find that companies with 
more foreign activities are less affected by political uncertainty in relation to the Brexit vote, 
in line with Beaulieu et al. (2005). Furthermore, our cross-sectional evidence extends findings 
of a recent study by Liu et al. (2017) who analyze the impact of the Bo Xilai political scandal 
on stock prices of Chinese firms. They show that firms which are more sensitive to monetary 
and fiscal policy and firms with political connections are more affected when political 
uncertainty increases. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical 
basis for the firm-level determinants of political uncertainty exposure related to Brexit. Section 
3 presents the Brexit exposure measures and Section 4 provides empirical evidence on cross-
sectional determinants of the exposure. Additional tests and robustness checks are presented in 
Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Determinants of Brexit Exposure – Theoretical Background and Motivation 
To develop predictions regarding the determinants of Brexit exposure we refer to the 
theoretical and empirical literature on political uncertainty. We also look at factors specific to 
the U.K.’s links with the E.U. and the European Single Market to highlight uncertainty 
regarding policies which may change after Brexit. 
 
2.1. Internationalization 
The literature provides different perspectives on the link between exposure to political 
uncertainty and internationalization. On the one hand, a firm can be viewed as a portfolio of 
projects or activities and if they are spread internationally, the firm can potentially benefit from 
diversification (e.g. Shapiro, 1978; Fatemi, 1984; Kwok and Reeb, 2000). According to that 
view, companies can diversify domestic risks by operating internationally, assuming that risks 
are not perfectly correlated across countries. In the context of our study, even though the 
consequences of Brexit are expected to spill-over to other countries, they are most severe 
locally, in the U.K., with the effect being more muted elsewhere, particularly beyond Europe. 
Therefore, we expect firms with larger foreign activities to be less exposed to Brexit-related 
uncertainty. This is supported by Beaulieu et al. (2005), who argue that a company with 
operations diversified geographically across different domestic markets can more easily shift 
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operations from one market to another and hence minimize the adverse impact of political 
uncertainty on costs of inputs, output prices or interest rates. They find that a portfolio of 
Quebec firms with foreign subsidiaries was less affected by increased political uncertainty 
associated with the Quebec independence referendum. Cao et al. (2017) show that firms 
increase cross-border acquisitions before elections which raise political uncertainty in the home 
market, demonstrating that internationalization can be a hedging mechanism against domestic 
political uncertainty. In the extreme, firms with established international operations, for 
example foreign subsidiaries, can escape political uncertainties in the home market by 
relocating or re-registering abroad.9 
The benefit of hedging local political uncertainties by international diversification is 
not the only reason why internationalized firms can do relatively better when political risk 
increases. An additional financial benefit can come from currency translation effects. When 
the local currency depreciates in the period of higher political uncertainty, as was the case for 
the pound around the Brexit referendum, the value of local-currency denominated foreign sales 
or assets increases, increasing the value of the firm. 
The above outlined benefits notwithstanding, some authors argue that firms with a 
higher degree of internationalization can potentially be more affected by political uncertainty. 
Boutchkova et al. (2012) argue that firms that rely on foreign trade are more affected when 
political uncertainty increases because the possible changes to trade agreements or regulations 
increase risks of their operations. As a consequence, future cash flows are much less certain 
for firms operating internationally than for firms with a domestic focus. The empirical evidence 
in Boutchkova et al. (2012) confirms that returns of firms more dependent on foreign trade are 
more volatile when political uncertainty increases. 
The arguments are formalized in a model by Handley and Limao (2015). They show 
that trade policy uncertainty reduces the present value of profits from foreign operations, and 
therefore a firm’s export investment and foreign sales. A similar argument applies to Brexit. 
Leaving the E.U. increases uncertainty about future tariffs between the U.K. and the E.U., and 
also between the U.K. and non-E.U. countries with which the E.U. has trade agreements, which 
can be expected to have a negative impact on British firms with international sales. 
                                                          
9 In the context of Brexit, a possible relocation was mentioned by several British companies with an international 
footing; see e.g. ‘HSBC warns of economic risks of UK pulling out of Europe’, Guardian, April 24, 2015; ‘EasyJet 
Opens Talks Over Post-Brexit HQ Move’, Sky News, July 1, 2016; ‘Javid: Single Market Access 'Number One 
Priority'’, Sky News, June 27, 2016. 
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Boutchkova et al. (2012) and Handley and Limao (2015) develop their arguments 
focusing on the impact of political uncertainty on exporters, however, the arguments can be 
extended to firms operating in complex international supply-chains or relying on international 
collaboration. Firms may lose suppliers, or the cost of supplies may go up, if the terms of trade 
become uncertain, implying that altogether firms with a higher level of internationalization are 
more affected by political uncertainty compared to domestic firms. 
Brexit-related uncertainties are also expected to negatively affect British firms with 
international operations which are subject to specific regulations, such as licensing or 
standardization. For example, financial firms located in London, one of the world’s leading 
financial centers, can currently freely operate in any European Economic Area country based 
on passporting rights. The Brexit vote brings considerable uncertainty regarding their future 
status and ability to operate internationally. Similar concerns about the negative effects of 
Brexit uncertainty were raised, for example, by chemical companies currently subject to 
European REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals) 
regulations.10 
 Taken together, given the different arguments presented above, the link between a 
firm’s internationalization and its exposure to Brexit-related political uncertainty remains an 
open empirical question. 
 
2.2. Growth and Investment Opportunities 
The value of the firm can be seen as the sum of the value of assets in place and future 
growth opportunities, where the value of those opportunities depends on the firm’s 
discretionary future investment (e.g. Myers, 1977). Myers (1977) notes that firms are valued 
on a going-concern basis and the value of the firm incorporates an expectation of the firm’s 
continued investment. However, political uncertainty affects discretionary investment 
decisions and hence has an impact on firms’ ability to exploit their growth and investment 
opportunities. 
The link between political uncertainty and investment has been studied in both 
theoretical (e.g., Bernanke, 1983; Aizenman and Marion, 1993; Bloom, 2009; Pastor and 
Veronesi, 2012) and empirical literature (e.g. Julio and Yook, 2012; Baker et al., 2016; Hassan 
et al., 2016). From a theoretical perspective, uncertainty increases the value of an option to 
delay an irreversible investment project. In periods of higher uncertainty, firms decide to 
                                                          
10 ‘Brexit Uncertainty Threatens Chemical Exports, Key Lawmaker Says’, Bloomberg, October 25, 2017. 
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postpone investment projects and take a ‘wait and see’ approach, waiting for new information 
to arrive and uncertainty to reduce. In support of this theoretical view, inter alia, Julio and 
Yook (2012) find that firms significantly reduce investment in election years, when political 
uncertainty is high. Furthermore, Baker et al. (2016) and Hassan et al. (2016) document that 
political uncertainty leads firms to reduce employment. 
In the cross-section of firms, the larger the proportion of the value of the firm in growth 
options, the more sensitive is the firm to future investment decisions. Since political uncertainty 
affects discretionary investment decisions, firms with higher growth opportunities are expected 
to be more sensitive to the changes in political uncertainty. Consequently, we expect that 
growing firms and firms with greater investment opportunities have a larger exposure to the 
uncertainty associated with Brexit.11 
 
2.3. Other Factors 
In this section we present other factors we consider to be potential determinants of the 
exposure to uncertainties associated with Brexit, which we control for in our analysis. 
We consider firm size for two reasons. First, we would like to appropriately identify 
and isolate the effect of internationalization, discussed above, which is potentially correlated 
with firm size (for example, foreign activities require a certain level of initial investment and 
hence only larger companies are able to afford it). Second, various theoretical arguments 
suggest that firm size can be a determinant of the exposure to political uncertainty but the sign 
of the expected effect is ambiguous. On the one hand, the literature on political uncertainty and 
political connections suggests greater exposure for large firms. Pastor and Veronesi (2012) 
show that larger firms command a higher government policy uncertainty risk premium because 
their capital covaries more closely with aggregate capital. According to the political cost 
hypothesis (Zimmerman, 1983), larger firms are subject to greater government scrutiny and 
hence we expect that they are more likely to be exposed to uncertainty about future government 
actions. These arguments are illustrated by evidence that larger firms, more often than small 
firms, have a politically connected board (Goldman et al., 2009), and lobby more (Borisov et 
al., 2016).  On the other hand, large firms are more stable and less likely to get into financial 
                                                          
11 Early anecdotal evidence suggests that some U.K. companies deferred investment in response to the Brexit 
vote; see e.g. ‘AstraZeneca chief demands clarity on post-Brexit landscape’, Financial Times, July 29, 2017 and 
‘Burberry puts UK trenchcoat factory on hold’, Financial Times, July 14, 2016. 
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distress in the period of increased uncertainty associated with Brexit. This last argument 
predicts a negative link between firm size and Brexit exposure. 
Other factors we look at are the firm’s financial strength and financial constraints. We 
argue that uncertainty about economic policies leads to weaker future overall economic 
conditions (e.g. Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2015; Baker et al., 2016) and since flight to quality 
(see, e.g. Bernanke et al., 1996) suggests that the costs of economic turmoil rise 
disproportionately more for firms in a weaker financial position, we suggest that firms in a 
weaker financial position, ceteris paribus, have greater Brexit exposure.   
We also consider the effect of foreign ownership. International investors are less 
exposed to risks in a specific country as they diversify across countries and hence we expect 
U.K. firms with a larger fraction of outstanding shares held by foreign investors to be less 
exposed to Brexit. However, less-than-perfect market integration is required to achieve benefits 
of international portfolio diversification and Bekaert et al. (2011) show that developed equity 
markets have been effectively integrated over the last two decades. Nonetheless, they document 
that market integration is time-varying and it decreases in periods of market uncertainty, 
offering scope for potential benefits given that Brexit raises market uncertainty. 
We also look at firm level political activity. In the context of Brexit we examine the 
firm’s lobbying activities in E.U. institutions (European Parliament and European 
Commission) to determine the extent to which a firm is connected to the existing E.U. political 
setup. E.U. lobbying indicates the firm’s reliance on the E.U., for example its legislation or 
funding and thus firms which lobby would be expected to be more affected by Brexit 
uncertainty. Liu et al. (2017) show that Chinese firms with greater connections to the current 
political setup are more affected by a disturbance to the Chinese political system. On the other 
hand, since lobbying can also be used to actively manage political uncertainty exposure (Akey, 
2015; Hassan et al., 2016), firms which lobby more can be less exposed to political uncertainty. 
The political discussion in the run-up to the Brexit referendum revolved around 
immigration; the European Single Market is associated with the freedom of movement of 
people. The Brexit vote is therefore linked with uncertainty about future government 
immigration policies and, in particular, the access of E.E.A. and Swiss citizens to the U.K. 
labor market. Therefore, we expect that firms reliant on the single market workforce, and, more 
generally, labor intensive firms, have higher political uncertainty exposure in the context of 
Brexit. 
 
 
11 
 
3. Measuring Political Uncertainty Exposure Associated with Brexit 
3.1 The Link between Stock Prices and Brexit Probability – Brexit Beta 
We start by estimating the Brexit exposure for each firm as the link between its stock 
returns and changes in the probability of a Brexit vote using the following time-series 
regression: 
 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (1) 
where rit is the return on stock i on day t and xt is the change in the probability of a leave 
(Brexit) vote on day t calculated from bookmakers’ odds, as defined and discussed in detail 
below. The estimation is similar to the approach in Snowberg et al. (2007) who measure the 
link between financial market movements and changes in George W. Bush’s chances for re-
election in 2004 and in Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2009) who estimate the market impact of 
changes in the probability of the 2003 Iraq war.12 The model is estimated separately for each 
firm using daily data over the period between February 20, 2016 (the day the referendum was 
announced), and June 22, 2016 (the day before the referendum). The sample period includes 
84 trading days. In Section 5 we show robustness of key findings of the paper and provide a 
series of additional tests in which we extend Model (1) to include additional control variables, 
such as the market (FTSE All Share index) return or global macro factors and general market 
uncertainty captured by changes in the S&P500 and VIX indices. 
βBi estimated in Model (1) is our coefficient of interest and we interpret it as firm i’s 
Brexit exposure – ‘Brexit beta’. We posit that an increasing (decreasing) probability of a Brexit 
vote is associated with increasing (decreasing) political uncertainty. If political uncertainty 
commands a risk premium (Pastor and Veronesi, 2013) and if it negatively affects economic 
growth and hence future cash flows (e.g. Bernanke, 1983; Aizenman and Marion, 1993; Bloom, 
2009; Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2015), an increase (decrease) in the probability of a Brexit 
vote is expected to lead to a decrease (increase) in stock prices. Therefore, we expect, on 
average, that Brexit betas will be negative across our sample firms. For each individual firm, 
where the Brexit beta is more negative, the Brexit exposure is greater.13 
                                                          
12 Our overall empirical approach is also similar to the methods used in the earlier literature to estimate the foreign 
exchange exposure of individual companies (e.g. Jorion, 1990; He and Ng, 1998). 
13 When talking about Brexit uncertainty we refer to the policy uncertainty associated with an eventual leave vote. 
Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) highlight the difference between election outcome uncertainty and political 
uncertainty. Election outcome uncertainty increases where the probabilities of the opposing options move towards 
50/50. Political uncertainty reflects the uncertainty in policy related to a particular outcome. Throughout the 
referendum period the leave vote probability that we employ remained below 50%, and thus an increase in the 
leave vote probability reflected both increased election outcome uncertainty and increased policy uncertainty.   
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The change in the probability of a leave (Brexit) vote, xt, the explanatory variable in 
Model (1) is calculated as: 
 𝑥𝑡 =
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒−𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡−1
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒
0.5−𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡−1
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 , (2) 
where 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 is the average implied probability of a leave vote on day t, calculated across 
the four largest fixed-odds bookmakers in the U.K.: Coral, Ladbrokes, Paddy Power and 
William Hill. Scaling the daily change in the probability by the distance from the 50/50 
probability of the dichotomous leave/remain outcomes captures the relative significance of the 
change in the probability;14 for example, a two-percentage point change (equivalent to, roughly, 
one standard deviation of daily changes in our sample, as reported below) is more meaningful 
when the gap is 10 percentage points than when it is 30 percentage points (approximately the 
minimum and maximum gap in our sample). However, in Section 5 below we show that our 
results are robust to alternative approaches to calculating xt, including scaling the change in the 
probability by the previous day’s probability or not scaling the daily change in Brexit 
probability. 
For each bookmaker j, the probability of a leave vote is calculated as: 
 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 =
1 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒⁄
1 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒+1 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛⁄⁄
, (3) 
where 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛) is the end of day t decimal odds offered by bookmaker j on the 
leave (remain) outcome of the referendum. The data on odds are sourced from Oddschecker. 
Odds can be updated 7 days a week but for consistency with the stock return measures, xt, used 
in Model (1) is calculated on the basis of probabilities measured on stock exchange trading 
days only. 
[Figure 1 and Table 1 about here] 
The probability of a Brexit vote over the sample period is presented in Figure 1, and 
Table 1 presents relevant descriptive statistics of the measure and scaled changes in the 
probability of Brexit, as defined in Model (2). Throughout the sample period the probability of 
a Brexit vote remained below 0.5, with a minimum of 0.179 on May 26 and a maximum of 
0.392 on June 15. The descriptive statistics of xt are presented in the fourth row of Table 1 
(‘Change in Probability Scaled by Lagged Gap’). The minimum of -1.009 indicates that the 
largest drop in the scaled probability of Brexit was observed when the previous day’s gap 
                                                          
14 As shown below, the gap was positive throughout the sample period which makes the interpretation easier, and 
it was never close to 0.50 which would have driven the denominator of xt to zero and hence xt to infinity, distorting 
its statistical properties. 
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between the leave probability and 0.5 approximately doubled, while the largest change in the 
opposite direction was observed when the gap narrowed by roughly a third (0.323). The median 
daily change is zero, and the mean daily change of -0.012 reflects the overall slight decrease in 
the probability of a Brexit vote from 0.314 at the beginning of the sample period to 0.245 on 
the day before the referendum. 
It is possible that the link between stock returns and changes in the probability of a 
Brexit vote reflects reverse causality: i.e. movements in financial markets affect revisions of 
bookmakers’ odds. We argue that such a possibility is not very likely in our setup. First, it is 
difficult to claim that stock prices of any individual company would influence bookmakers, 
and our estimation is at the level of the individual firm. Second, we estimate the model at the 
relatively high frequency of daily observations, whereas any potential reverse causality is only 
likely to lead to biases in estimated coefficients at lower frequencies (Snowberg et al., 2007). 
  
3.2 Probability of Brexit – Validation of the Measure 
 Ex post it is clear that the prediction based on bookmakers’ odds was wrong, as on June 
23 51.9% of the voters voted in favor of an exit from the European Union. The outcome brought 
bookmakers into the spotlight with commentators casting doubt on the usefulness of their odds 
as a basis for predictions.15 Below we offer several arguments to validate the use of the measure 
based on bookmakers’ odds in our empirical tests. 
 Even though the prediction based on the odds proved incorrect ex post, there is no clear 
reason to argue that the odds were uninformative ex ante. First, given the specific nature of 
referendums, a parallel could be drawn between the Brexit referendum and the 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum when bookmakers’ odds proved to be a good predictor of the result 
(Acker and Duck, 2015). Second, possibly linked to the success in predicting the Scottish 
referendum result, bookmakers’ odds received substantial media attention in the run-up to the 
Brexit referendum with revisions in odds reaching news headlines.16 An online search of the 
Financial Times archives for articles containing the words ‘Brexit’ and ‘bookmakers’ in the 
body of the text returns 42 items during our sample period of 84 trading days. Third, it is 
reported that the odds were tilted by larger bets placed on remain compared to leave17 but if 
the larger flow of money put on remain was fairly constant throughout the sample period, it 
                                                          
15 See, e.g., ‘EU Referendum: How the bookies got it so wrong over Brexit’, independent.co.uk, June 24, 2016.  
16 See, e.g., ‘Bookmakers cut Remain odds despite narrow polls’, Financial Times, May 20, 2016; ‘Betting odds 
tilt towards Brexit’, fastFT, June 6, 2016. 
17 ‘Big London Bets Tilted Bookmakers’ ‘Brexit’ Odds’, Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2016. 
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systematically biased the level of the implied probability of a leave vote downwards but did 
not directly affect the information conveyed by changes in the probability we use in the 
estimation of Model (1). Moreover, the betting market in the run-up to the referendum was 
quite active and deep which made it less prone to potential noise coming from individual bets. 
Betting on the Brexit referendum outcome broke the U.K. record for non-sporting events, with 
an estimated GBP 120 million wagered through betting exchanges and bookmaking firms.18 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Furthermore, in what follows, we show how the probability of a Brexit vote moved in 
response to the news flow, including opinion polls, during the campaign. This indicates that it 
was not pure noise and contained (or aggregated) economically relevant information. In Figure 
2, Panel A, the probability of a Brexit vote is plotted against the Brexit news coverage in the 
Financial Times. The coverage is calculated as the average number of articles containing the 
word ‘Brexit’ over the previous 7 days, searched in the online archives at FT.com. The news 
coverage proxies for the news flow relevant for updating expectations regarding the outcome 
of the referendum. After the initial spike following the announcement of the referendum on 
February 20, the article count went down and started picking up in April when the referendum 
campaign officially started on April 15. It gradually went up towards the referendum day as 
the campaign intensified. The behavior of the leave probability is consistent with it being a 
measure incorporating relevant news. The probability remained stable when the news flow was 
relatively small, and the daily variation in the probability increased when more news was 
flowing to the market. 
In Panel B of Figure 2, the probability of a Brexit vote is plotted against the percentage-
point lead of remain over leave in polls of voting intentions, after excluding ‘don’t knows’. 
The data are obtained from whatukthinks.org, a website run by NatCen Social Research. The 
measure is the so-called poll-of-polls and is calculated as the average of the six most recent 
poll results available. The plot shows a close link between the two measures, which is 
particularly strong in the second part of the sample period, with the probability of leave going 
up (down) when the polls swing against (in favor of) a remain vote. Again, the evidence 
confirms that the proxy based on bookmakers’ odds reflects publicly available information 
about the prospects of a Brexit vote. 
                                                          
18 ‘Brexit wagers set new record for non-sports bets’, Financial Times, June 26, 2016. 
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 To further validate the measure of the probability of a leave vote derived from 
bookmakers’ odds, we plot it against the USD/GBP exchange rate (Panel C of Figure 2) 
sourced from Datastream. Ex post we know that the strongest reaction to the referendum 
outcome was observed on the foreign exchange market. On the announcement of the 
referendum result on June 24, the pound lost 8.0% against the dollar, compared to a 3.8% drop 
in the FTSE All Share index. The plot in Panel C of Figure 2 shows a very close link between 
the value of the pound and the probability of a leave vote, which confirms that the calculated 
probability contains the same economically relevant information employed by foreign 
exchange market investors. 
 Taking all of the above arguments together, we argue that the probability of a Brexit 
vote calculated from bookmakers’ odds is a meaningful measure that contains relevant 
information despite its systematically biased level and ex post incorrect prediction of the 
outcome of the vote. 
 
3.3 Stock Price Reaction to the Referendum Result 
To minimize the concerns that bookmakers’ odds were not fully informative, we also 
use a standard event study approach to estimate firms’ Brexit exposures and measure stock 
price reactions to the referendum result. Given that it has been widely reported that the vote for 
Brexit came as a surprise, both within and outside the U.K., the referendum result provides a 
reasonably clean shock that we can use to measure the impact of Brexit on individual 
companies. 
For every firm in our sample we estimate a buy-and-hold return measured over the day 
of the referendum result (Day 0, June 24, 2016) and the following trading day (Day 1, June 27, 
2016): 
𝐵𝐻𝑅(0,1)𝑖 = {∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
1
𝑡=0 } − 1, (4) 
where rit is stock i’s return on day t. In Section 5 we show robustness of our results to alternative 
approaches: measuring the stock price reaction on Day 0 only and calculating buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns using the CAPM or the Fama-French model as benchmarks. As outlined in 
Section 3.1, political uncertainty associated with Brexit is expected to have a negative impact 
on stock prices by increasing the risk premium and negatively affecting future cash flows. 
Where BHR(0,1)i is more negative, the Brexit exposure is greater. 
 We use the two measures – the Brexit beta and stock price reaction to the referendum 
result – as complementary measures to test the robustness of our cross-sectional results. As 
mentioned above, the event study approach benefits from not relying on Brexit probability 
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estimated from bookmakers’ odds. However, the asset pricing literature (e.g. Fama and French, 
1992) shows that firm characteristics which we employ to capture Brexit exposure (most 
notably size and market-to-book) are typically used to explain the cross-section of stock 
returns. In an event study approach we hence run the risk of capturing the normal determinants 
of stock returns and incorrectly interpreting them as determinants of Brexit exposure. In 
robustness tests in Section 5 we explore alternative ways to estimate the stock price reaction, 
including the Fama-French approach which explicitly controls for the effect of firm size and 
market-to-book ratio on stock returns to minimize the risk of incorrect inferences. The Brexit 
beta introduced in Section 3.1 has the advantage of being unaffected by the average level of 
stock returns for a firm, which is captured by the model constant (β0i). 
 
3.4 Sample 
The sample is constructed in the following way. First, we obtain the list of all stocks 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) on January 1, 2016 from the stock exchange 
website.19 Only companies incorporated in the United Kingdom with a Premium Listing on the 
Main Market of the exchange are retained, and the sample further excludes companies in the 
following sectors (as classified by the LSE): Equity Investment Instruments, Non-Equity 
Investment Instruments, Real Estate Investment and Services, and Real Estate Investment 
Trusts. The exclusion is aimed at limiting the sample to operating companies (manufacturers 
of goods or service providers) for which comparable characteristics can be identified for the 
cross-sectional analysis. Finally, to be included in the sample, total return data for the stock 
have to be available in Datastream. 
 Brexit beta (βBi), our coefficient of interest in Model (1) might be underestimated for 
thinly-traded companies (e.g. Dimson, 1979), therefore to avoid biased estimates, we exclude 
from the final sample the least liquid firms. They are also likely to have the least reliable 
estimates of BHR(0,1)i, the stock price reaction to the referendum result. We base our illiquidity 
measure on the frequency of zero returns, as proposed by Lesmond et al. (1999), and exclude 
companies with more than 8 zero returns in the sample period (approximately 10% of days). 
The final sample contains 331 firms. 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/historic/company-files/company-files.htm 
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3.5 Descriptive Statistics of Brexit Exposure Measures 
Table 2 presents detailed descriptive statistics of both Brexit exposure measures: Brexit 
beta (βBi) in Panel A and the market reaction to the Brexit vote (BHR(0,1)i) in Panel B. The 
full-sample means and medians of both measures are negative, indicating that in line with 
theoretical predictions, political uncertainty associated with Brexit has a negative impact on 
stock returns. The average firm lost 13% of its value when the referendum result was 
announced (Panel B), and, similarly, in the pre-referendum period, increases in the probability 
of Brexit led to decreases in stock prices (Panel A).20 To illustrate the economic significance 
of Brexit betas, the mean βBi of -0.025 indicates that when the gap between the probability of 
a Brexit vote and 0.50 decreased by 13.6% (one standard deviation of xt) stock prices fell on 
that day, on average, by 0.34%.21 For both measures we find large cross-section variation which 
shows that individual firms are differently exposed to Brexit and it lends support to the main 
aim of our study. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The Pearson’s (Spearman’s rank) correlation coefficient between the two measures in 
the full sample is 0.297 (0.475), significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that they are 
positively linked but for various reasons related to the market behavior and measurement of 
the variables, the relation is not perfect.22 
To shed light on Brexit exposure across industries, we use the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) to split firms into 10 groups. This classification leaves a meaningful number 
of firms in the majority of industries. Setting aside the Telecommunication and Utilities sectors 
which are represented by only a handful of firms, for both Brexit exposure measures firms in 
the Financials, Consumer Goods and Consumer Services sectors are the most exposed to Brexit 
(have the most negative mean Brexit betas and market reactions), while firms in the Basic 
Materials and Healthcare sectors are the least exposed. 
Financial firms come as the most exposed to political uncertainty associated with Brexit 
for different possible reasons. First, it is documented that political uncertainty leads to a 
                                                          
20 The estimated Brexit beta coefficient is negative and statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level in 
nearly a half (49.2%) of the sample stocks, and it is positive and significant for 3 firms. 
21 -0.025  0.136 = -0.0034 
22 The Pearson’s correlation coefficient can be influenced by outliers. For the Brexit exposure measures 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, which we use in cross-sectional regressions below to limit the impact of 
outliers on our results, the correlation coefficient is 0.435. In unreported results we also examine average stock 
returns around the referendum date for portfolios of stocks formed by reference to their Brexit beta, and this 
analysis confirms a high degree of correspondence between the two measures of Brexit exposure. 
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deterioration of economic conditions (e.g. Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2015; Baker et al., 
2016) and, similarly, it was expected that a Brexit vote would have a negative impact on the 
British economy.23 In weakening economic conditions profitability of banks and other 
financials goes down due to reduced demand for new loans and increasing bad debts, and it is 
further depressed in low interest rate environments expected when economic conditions are 
weak. Moreover, the high Brexit exposure of financial firms reflects uncertainty about the post-
Brexit status of the City of London as a major international financial center. Currently, financial 
firms located and regulated in the U.K. benefit from passporting rights that allow them to 
operate freely across the whole European Economic Area. Brexit is expected to bring major 
disruption in this respect, with uncertainty about future E.E.A. membership. The high exposure 
of financial firms we find indicates that the stock market investors saw the adverse effect of 
this uncertainty as more important than the potential benefits of internationalization of British 
financial firms that could reduce their exposure to domestic risks. Political uncertainty and 
politically-induced weakening of economic conditions also translate into changes to household 
disposable income as well as household spending and saving behavior (Giavazzi and 
McMahon, 2012). Therefore, we see relatively high Brexit exposure among firms in the 
Consumer Goods and Consumer Services sectors. 
Basic Materials and Healthcare firms are least exposed to Brexit-related uncertainty. 
Many of the firms in these sectors are multinational companies with significant operations or 
revenues overseas. While they are also potentially negatively affected by the uncertainty of 
post-Brexit foreign trade agreements, their foreign operations provide diversification of 
domestic risks (e.g. Shapiro, 1978; Fatemi, 1984; Kwok and Reeb, 2000). It is also possible 
that they benefit from the weakening pound against other currencies which increases the pound-
denominated value of foreign sales or assets. We conduct specific tests to separate 
diversification benefits from exchange rate benefits in Section 4.3. 
Taken together, the results reveal that in the run-up to the referendum stock prices 
reacted negatively, on average, to the prospect of a Brexit vote, and then they decreased sharply 
when the U.K. surprisingly voted for Brexit. There was substantial variation in the Brexit 
exposure of individual sectors. Cross-sectional tests of the determinants of the exposure at the 
level of the individual firm are presented in Section 4 below. 
 
                                                          
23 See, e.g. ‘Brexit carries risk of recession, warns Bank of England’, Financial Times, May 12, 2016; ‘IMF chief 
warns of damage from Brexit vote’, Financial Times, May 13, 2016. 
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4. Determinants of Brexit Exposure – Empirical Evidence 
4.1. Variables and Regression Specification 
Section 2 above discusses theoretical arguments and motivation for cross-sectional 
determinants of Brexit exposure. Below we present empirical proxies of the determinants used 
in the regression analysis. 
We quantify the firm’s internationalization following a similar approach to Garcia and 
Norli (2012), by counting the number of foreign countries mentioned in the firm’s last 
(2015/2016) annual report published before the Brexit referendum. Annual reports are sourced 
from Thomson One and firms’ websites. Specifically, the foreign country count variable is 
defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of foreign countries mentioned in the 
report. This measure captures internationalization in a comprehensive manner. In addition to 
foreign sales, subsidiaries and assets, it picks up, inter alia, information on suppliers, new 
contracts or joint ventures and thereby provides a more complete picture of geographical 
exposure. To explore geographical diversification in more detail, we use these foreign country 
count data to separately calculate the European Single Market country count and other country 
count. As a robustness check we use standard proxies of internationalization i.e. foreign sales 
measured as the fraction of total sales generated from foreign operations, and foreign assets 
measured as the fraction of total assets relating to foreign operations.  
It is challenging to find good empirical proxies for (unobservable) growth and 
investment opportunities (Adam and Goyal, 2008) therefore we use several alternative 
candidates. For all firms in the sample we use the market-to-book (MB) ratio24 and three-year 
sales growth. In the subsample of non-financial firms we additionally use capital expenditures 
(Capex) scaled by the previous year’s total assets and research and development (R&D) 
expenses scaled by total sales as direct measures of investment and development. Missing R&D 
expenses are set to zero and following the recommendation in Koh and Reeb (2015) we 
additionally include in regressions an R&D dummy which is equal to one if R&D expenses for 
the firm are non-missing, and is equal to zero for missing observations. 
Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s stock market capitalization 
(in GBP million) sourced from Datastream. Profitability, as a proxy for financial strength, is 
measured using return on equity (ROE) and is calculated as net income less preferred dividends 
                                                          
24 Beaulieu et al. (2005) argue that firms with low assets in place (proxied by high MB) are less affected by 
political risks because they can more easily relocate to a lower risk environment. Such an interpretation of the MB 
ratio gives the opposite prediction regarding the link between Brexit exposure and MB ratio to the one we discuss 
in Section 2. 
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divided by the average of current year’s and previous year’s common equity. Foreign 
ownership is obtained from Thomson One and is defined as the percentage of shares 
outstanding held by investors located outside the U.K. E.U. lobbying is measured as the 
midpoint of the range of the declared E.U. lobbying costs (converted to GBP) scaled by total 
sales and multiplied by 100. Lobbying costs are collected from LobbyFacts.eu. The single 
market workforce is the fraction of the workforce in the sector the firm belongs to (defined by 
the 2-digit British SIC code) born in a European Single Market country other than the U.K. It 
is calculated based on data pooled from 4 quarterly Labor Force Surveys (LFS) conducted in 
2016, available from the Office for National Statistics. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets, and cash holdings is cash scaled by total assets, and both measures are proxies for 
financial strength and financial constraints. Assets per employee is the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of total assets to the number of employees. Higher values of the measure reflect lower 
labor intensity. 
 Unless stated otherwise, the variables are sourced from Worldscope and are measured 
at the end of 2015 to avoid the firms’ characteristics being influenced by the referendum and 
the possibility of reverse causality in our empirical setting. Descriptive statistics of explanatory 
variables are presented in Table 3. In this table and in all subsequent regressions, all variables, 
both dependent and explanatory, are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to limit the impact 
of outliers on estimated coefficients. After excluding firms with missing observations, the 
largest sample on which regressions are run consists of 297 firms. There is reduced availability 
of data on foreign sales and foreign assets, and the sample of non-financial firms contains up 
to 251 firms. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 It is worth noting the high internationalization of U.K. firms. The average sample firm 
mentions 25 different foreign countries in its annual report (9 in the European Single Market 
and 16 others), and it generates 46.4% of its sales and holds 28.0% of its assets overseas. 
 To estimate the determinants of Brexit exposure in the full sample we run the following 
cross-sectional regression: 
 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑛𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑀𝐵𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑗 + 
 +𝛼3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼4𝐿𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼6𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗 + 
 +𝛼7𝐸𝑈𝐿𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗, (5) 
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where BrexitExposureij is the Brexit exposure measure for firm i in industry j, and it is either 
firm i’s Brexit beta (βBi) or its stock price reaction to the Brexit vote (BHR(0,1)i), as defined in 
Section 3. All independent variables are defined as above. 
We run an extended regression for non-financial firms that includes additional 
independent variables which are either meaningless or not directly comparable for financial 
firms due to their fundamentally different nature and different reporting requirements (for 
example, Capex, R&D expenses, labor intensity, leverage or cash holdings): 
 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑛𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑀𝐵𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑗 + 
 +𝛼3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼5𝑅&𝐷𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼6𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 
 +𝛼7𝐿𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼8𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼9𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼10𝐸𝑈𝐿𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 
 +𝛼11𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼12𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼13𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 
 +𝛼14𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗. (6) 
All regressions control for industry fixed effects (uj) to take into account possible 
unobservable industry-level factors. Industries are defined according to the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB). All models are estimated via OLS with heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. 
 
4.2. Regression Results 
The results of the regression tests are reported in Table 4. As explained in Section 3, 
Brexit beta (βBi) and the market reaction to the Brexit vote (BHR(0,1)i) are more negative for 
firms with higher Brexit exposure, hence variables with a positive (negative) coefficient are 
associated with reduced (increased) exposure. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Across all regressions we find strong evidence that internationalization measured with 
the foreign country count has a moderating effect on Brexit exposure. The coefficients are 
positive and highly statistically significant indicating that, ceteris paribus, stock prices of firms 
with a larger international exposure decreased less (or even increased) when the probability of 
a Brexit vote went up, and they had higher (or less negative) returns when the referendum result 
was announced. The result is consistent with the diversification benefit of international 
operations. The economic significance of the moderating effect of internationalization is also 
large. For example, the coefficient of 0.0504 in specification (iii) indicates that a one standard 
deviation increase in the foreign country count (0.857, as reported in Table 3) is associated 
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with a 4.3 percentage point higher (less negative) buy-and-hold return. To put this in a 
perspective, the average buy-and-hold return in the full sample is -13%. 
As previously discussed, the positive effect of internationalization could also be driven 
by the weakening of the GBP associated with Brexit uncertainties. We explore this alternative 
explanation in detail in Section 4.3 below. 
The link between Brexit exposure and growth and investment opportunities is less 
clear-cut. Across model specifications we find some evidence consistent with our prediction 
that growth firms are more affected by Brexit-related uncertainties. We find that higher MB 
ratio firms have lower (more negative) Brexit betas (specifications (i) and (ii)) and firms with 
higher sales growth have lower (more negative) buy-and-hold returns around the vote result 
(specifications (iii) and (iv)). However, other proxies for firm growth (Capex and R&D 
expenses) are insignificant, while in specification (iv) we somewhat surprisingly find that firms 
with non-missing R&D expenses are less exposed to Brexit uncertainties (the coefficient is 
positive indicating a less negative market reaction to Brexit).25 Given that the results depend 
on the model specification and the proxy used, we conclude that while our evidence is 
indicative, we are not able to draw firm conclusions about the link between Brexit exposure 
and growth opportunities. 
Among the control variables, as indicated above, we find that larger firms are more 
affected by Brexit as the coefficients of firm size are negative and highly significant across all 
model specifications. This result is consistent with theoretical predictions in Pastor and 
Veronesi (2012) and with the political cost hypothesis of Zimmerman (1983). The result is 
potentially important for the stock market as a whole, given the significance of large-cap firms 
for broad stock market indices. We also find a moderating effect of higher profitability (ROE) 
on Brexit beta. We do not find any statistically significant relation between exposure to Brexit-
related uncertainty and other control variables which might indicate that the market does not 
see them as relevant factors in pricing the impact of Brexit. 
To summarize the results related to our key variables of interest, the regression analysis 
reveals that, ceteris paribus, more internationalized firms are less exposed to Brexit-related 
political uncertainty, and there is some evidence of higher Brexit exposure of high-growth 
                                                          
25 We use R&D expenses as a proxy for growth opportunities. However, the literature provides also an alternative 
view on the link between political uncertainty and R&D spending which can explain our empirical finding. Berk 
et al. (2004) show that R&D expenses, due to their nature, can be seen as a compound option on systematic 
uncertainty. Atanassov et al. (2018) build on this insight and argue that, as a result, higher political uncertainty 
increases the value of R&D investment. This can explain why we find some evidence that the value of firms with 
non-zero R&D expenses decreased less compared to firms without R&D expenses in response to the Brexit vote. 
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firms. To outline in a graphical form the effect of internationalization, the most robust 
determinant of Brexit exposure in our tests, Figure 3 presents the performance of equally-
weighted portfolios formed on the basis of the foreign country count around the referendum 
result date. The portfolio of firms in the bottom quartile of internationalization (Q1) is clearly 
the most affected by the Brexit vote, while the effect of Brexit on the portfolio of firms in the 
top quartile of internationalization (Q4), is limited. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
4.3. Sources of Benefits of Internationalization 
As reported in Section 4.2, we find strong and robust evidence that firms with a larger 
international exposure are less affected by Brexit uncertainty. The result is consistent with the 
diversification benefits of internationalization but could also be driven by exchange rate effects. 
In this subsection, we develop supplementary tests to shed more light on these two 
interpretations. 
To test if the benefit of internationalization is driven purely by the weakening of the 
pound associated with Brexit, we first re-estimate the Brexit beta controlling for the foreign 
exchange exposure of each firm. The underlying idea is to split the sensitivity to Brexit 
uncertainties into the sensitivity to exchange rate changes and the sensitivity to Brexit 
uncertainties net of the exchange rate effect. Specifically, we re-run Model (1) controlling for 
changes in the GBP/USD exchange rate, in the spirit of Jorion (1990): 
 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝐺𝐵𝑃𝑈𝑆𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (7) 
where 𝑟𝑡
𝐺𝐵𝑃𝑈𝑆𝐷 is the percentage change in the GBP/USD exchange rate on day t, and all other 
notation is as before. In this extended model, βxi captures the effect of foreign exchange rate 
movements on stock returns, leaving βBi to capture the effect of Brexit-related uncertainties net 
of currency effects. Hence, if internationalization affects Brexit beta through the exchange rate 
channel only, we should see no link between internationalization and Brexit beta estimated 
from Model (7) after allowing for exchange rate effects. We then re-run baseline regressions 
using βBi’s estimated from Model (7) as the dependent variable. The results of the estimation 
are reported in columns (i) and (ii) of Table 5. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The results clearly confirm the strong and robust link between Brexit beta and foreign 
diversification. The coefficients of the foreign country count variable across both specifications 
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are positive and highly significant, with even larger magnitudes than in the baseline tests 
reported in Table 4. Therefore, we conclude that the moderating impact of foreign activities on 
Brexit exposure is not driven by currency movements and is consistent with the diversification 
benefits of internationalization which reduces the exposure of firms to domestic political 
uncertainty. 
We also re-estimate regressions (5) and (6) substituting the foreign country count with 
the separately calculated European (specifically, European Single Market) country count and 
other country count. If our key result is driven by diversification benefits, we should find a 
stronger impact for non-European exposure. Brexit uncertainties are likely to affect the rest of 
Europe, at least to some extent, and thus European operations are expected to provide a weaker 
diversification mechanism of the Brexit exposure of U.K. firms. The results of the new 
regressions are reported in columns (iii) to (vi) of Table 5. We find that the coefficient of the 
non-European country count is larger in magnitude and, unlike the coefficient of the European 
country count, is statistically significant, consistent with our prediction. However, the F-test 
for differences between the two coefficients is significant only for regressions with BHR(0,1)i 
as the dependent variable (columns (v) and (vi)). Nevertheless, the evidence confirms our 
diversification argument as we find that the effect of foreign activities is driven by global 
activities beyond Europe where the diversification benefits are likely to be strongest. 
 
4.4. Alternative Measures of Internationalization 
In the main tests of this paper a firm’s internationalization is proxied with the number 
of countries mentioned in its annual report. This measure has the benefit of capturing different 
aspects of internationalization – sales in foreign markets, foreign subsidiaries or offices, 
international supply chains or new international contracts. It also has the benefit of being 
available for each firm. In this section we check the robustness of our conclusions regarding 
the impact of internationalization on Brexit exposure employing reported foreign sales or 
foreign assets, which capture foreign activities in a more focused way.26 The results of re-
estimated baseline regressions are reported in Table 6. 
[Table 6 about here] 
                                                          
26 We do not include the foreign country count and foreign sales or assets together in a regression because they 
are highly correlated. The correlation between the foreign country count and foreign sales is 0.610, and between 
the foreign country count and foreign assets it is 0.522. The correlation between foreign sales and assets is 0.723. 
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Across all model specifications the coefficient of foreign sales is positive and 
statistically significant. The coefficient of foreign assets is positive and highly significant 
where BHR(0,1)i is the dependent variable (specifications (vii) and (viii)) and is positive but 
insignificant in regressions where βBi is the dependent variable (specifications (iii) and (iv)). 
Overall, the tests confirm our key finding of the moderating impact of foreign activities on 
Brexit exposure.27 
These additional tests suggest that the benefits of international diversification arise from 
outputs sold into foreign markets (i.e. the international diversification of the revenue base) and 
probably also from diversification of inputs (i.e. the international diversification of the cost 
base). Reported foreign sales directly measure international diversification of the revenue base. 
Foreign assets can be used as a proxy for international diversification of inputs, based on the 
assumption that firms choose an international location of operations (assets) to benefit from 
access to foreign labor, materials or other production inputs, however the proxy is weaker in 
this case since complete data on international diversification of the cost base is not available at 
the firm level.28 
 
5. Further Tests and Robustness Checks 
5.1. Alternative Estimation of Brexit Betas 
 In this section we explore alternative methods of estimating Brexit betas. We start by 
re-estimating Model (1) with an alternative definition of xt. In the first revised estimation we 
define xt as a raw (not scaled) change in the probability of Brexit (‘Change in Probability (Not 
Scaled)’ reported in Table 1): 
 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡−1
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒. (8) 
This approach makes a simplifying assumption that the market reaction to the change in the 
probability of a leave vote does not depend on how close the probability is to the 50/50 split, 
but at the same time it makes the interpretation of βBi more straightforward. In the revised 
approach βBi directly measures the market assessment of the value effect of Brexit, defined as 
                                                          
27 Because the value of foreign sales or foreign assets is directly affected by the exchange rate, in unreported tests 
we also test the link between foreign sales or assets and the Brexit beta net of currency effects estimated from 
Model (7). Coefficients of both foreign sales and foreign assets are positive and statistically significant in all 
specifications. 
28 For example, firms do not report data on imports used in production. Sourcing strategies as well as integration 
strategies of multinational firms are very complex (Helpman, 2006), therefore any conclusions related to inputs 
have to be drawn with caution. 
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the stock return associated with a hypothetical change in the probability of a leave vote from 0 
to 1. 
 Second, we re-run Model (1) defining xt as the daily percentage change in the 
probability of a leave vote (‘Change in Probability Scaled by Lagged Probability’ reported in 
Table 1): 
 𝑥𝑡 =
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒−𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡−1
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡−1
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 . (9) 
Third, we re-run Model (1) by adding a lagged change in the probability of a Brexit 
vote, xt-1: 
 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵1𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐵2𝑖𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (10) 
with xt defined as in the baseline tests (Equation (2)). Brexit exposure is then calculated as the 
sum of the coefficients of the contemporaneous and lagged x (𝛽𝐵1𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵2𝑖). This approach takes 
into account the possibility of Brexit related news arriving late in the day, moving bookmakers’ 
odds after stock exchange trading hours29 and therefore being incorporated into stock prices 
the following day. 
 Fourth, we re-estimate the Brexit beta controlling for market-wide factors captured by 
the return on the FTSE All Share index: 
 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (11) 
where xt is defined as in the baseline tests (Equation (2)) and 𝑟𝑡
𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸 is the return on the FTSE 
All Share index on day t. Adding the market return changes the interpretation of a firm’s Brexit 
beta (βBi) given that the FTSE index is itself expected to be affected by Brexit-related 
uncertainties. βBi in Model (11) measures the firm-specific, residual Brexit exposure not 
captured by Brexit exposure of the whole market and hence is not directly comparable to 
magnitudes of Brexit betas estimated in the baseline Model (1). 
 To move closer to measuring the full Brexit exposure of each firm but still controlling 
for broad macro-level developments, including general economic uncertainty, we re-run Model 
(1) controlling for S&P500 returns and changes in the VIX index which are less likely to be 
affected by the changing probability of Brexit: 
 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚1𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑆&𝑃500 + 𝛽𝑚2𝑖𝑟𝑡−1
𝑆&𝑃500 + 𝛽𝑣1𝑖Δ𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽𝑣2𝑖Δ𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (12) 
where  𝑟𝑡
𝑆&𝑃500 is the return on the S&P500 index on day t and Δ𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 is the change in the value 
of the VIX index on day t. All other notation is as before. Due to non-overlapping trading hours 
between the U.K. and the U.S. – markets in the U.S. close later than in the U.K. – the model 
                                                          
29 We do not have time-stamped changes in odds, we only have data on end-of-day (11:59pm) prevailing odds. 
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includes both day t’s and t-1’s S&P500 returns and changes in the VIX. The model allows us 
to isolate the effect of Brexit over and above other market-wide factors. Data on the FTSE All 
Share, S&P500 and VIX indices are from Datastream. 
 
5.2. Alternative Estimation of the Stock Price Reaction to the Referendum Result 
 We also test the robustness of our results to different methods of measuring the stock 
price reaction to the referendum outcome. First, we measure the stock price reaction as a one-
day stock return on June 24 , the day the referendum result was announced (Day 0). Second, 
we calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the two-day event window (Day 0, June 24; 
Day 1, June 27) as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(0,1)𝑖 = {∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
1
𝑡=0 } − {∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑡)
1
𝑡=0 }, (13) 
where rit is stock i’s actual return and rbit is stock i’s benchmark return on day t. The benchmark 
returns (rbi) for each day are calculated by reference to the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), or, alternatively, the Fama-French three factor model: 
 𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑡 =  𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑀 = 𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑖(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡), (14) 
 𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑡 =  𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑖(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑣𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 , (15) 
where the risk-free rate (rft) is the return on three-month U.K. Treasury bills and the market 
return (rmt) is the return on the FTSE All Share Index on day t. The returns are obtained from 
Datastream. SMBt and HMLt are day t’s returns on the size and value factor portfolios 
respectively, the calculation of which is set out in Gregory et al. (2013). The daily returns to 
the factor portfolios are made available by Gregory et al.30 Stock i’s market beta in the CAPM 
model (mi) and the betas in the Fama-French model (mi, si, vi) are calculated employing 
daily returns for the pre-referendum period from January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015. 
 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR(0,1)i) calculated from Model (13) control for 
each firm’s exposure to market movements and size and value factors which have been 
employed to determine the cross-section of stock returns. A stock’s buy-and-hold abnormal 
return measures the firm specific price reaction to Brexit not captured by the market-wide 
reaction. As above, the magnitude of BHAR(0,1)i is not directly comparable to the magnitude 
of the buy-and-hold (unadjusted) returns used as the measure of Brexit exposure in the baseline 
tests. 
 
 
                                                          
30 http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/centres/xfi/famafrench/ 
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5.3. Descriptive Statistics and Regressions for Alternative Brexit Exposure Measures 
 Descriptive statistics of the Brexit exposure measures estimated using the alternative 
methods are presented in Table 7. 
[Table 7 about here] 
All results confirm a large cross-sectional dispersion of the estimated Brexit exposure. 
As expected, the methods that control for market-wide movements (rows (iv), (vii) and (viii)) 
have mean estimates lower in absolute magnitudes than baseline estimates reported in Table 2.  
The calculation based on the raw change in the probability of a leave vote (row (i)) 
yields the mean coefficient of -0.164 which indicates that the market priced the total impact of 
Brexit, on average, as a reduction in value of 16.4%. The result is in line with the results of the 
event study presented in Table 2 where the average buy-and-hold return in reaction to the 
referendum result is -13.0%. Assuming that the market priced a non-zero probability of a Brexit 
vote shortly before the referendum - the probability of a leave vote implied form bookmakers 
odds was 0.245 the day before the referendum - the reaction observed is the price adjustment 
to the referendum outcome. If, for simplicity, we assume that the scenario of no-Brexit is value 
neutral, and the scenario of Brexit leads to a value decrease of 16.4% (as estimated above), an 
increase in the probability of Brexit from 0.245 to 1 (the confirmed referendum result) leads to 
a price adjustment of 12.4%, very close to the mean buy-and-hold return of 13.0%.31 Again, 
this result confirms that the two broad alternative approaches to measure Brexit exposure used 
in this study (Brexit beta and the stock price reaction to the Brexit vote) present a consistent 
picture. 
When we estimate Brexit exposure including the lagged change in the probability of a 
Brexit vote (Model (10) above, with the estimates presented in row (iii) of Table 7) the 
magnitude of the mean exposure measure increases slightly from -0.025 in baseline tests to 
-0.030 in the revised tests. Overall however, we find that the potential problems of non-
synchronous measurement of returns and changes in bookmakers’ odds is limited; the 
coefficient of the lagged change in Brexit probability, βB2i in Model (10), is significant at the 5 
percent level for only 15 firms (there are 11 negative and 4 positive coefficients; results are not 
tabulated). 
                                                          
31 (1 - 0.245)  -0.164 = -0.124 
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Regression results with alternative estimates of the Brexit beta as the dependent 
variable are presented in Table 8, and the results for alternative estimates of the stock price 
reaction to the Brexit vote are presented in Table 9. 
[Tables 8 and 9 about here] 
Across all model specifications in both tables we confirm that internationalization has 
a moderating impact on Brexit exposure. This result is very robust and highly statistically 
significant. We also confirm our baseline results for the link between Brexit exposure and 
growth opportunities – the results indicate that high-growth firms are more exposed but the 
significance of specific measures of growth (MB ratio or sales growth) varies across regression 
models. Also, the results for control variables are broadly in line with the main results presented 
in Table 4. 
In sum, the different approaches to measuring Brexit exposure summarized in Table 7 
above reveal the same cross-sectional regularities, confirming the robustness of key findings 
of this paper. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines the firm-level determinants of British public companies’ exposure 
to Brexit, an unprecedented political event which substantially increased political uncertainty. 
On June 23, 2016 the U.K. voted to leave the E.U. with far-reaching consequences affecting 
virtually all government policies. This paper contributes to the literature by providing an 
analysis of the determinants of exposure to uncertainty associated with a major political event 
at the firm level. As such, it provides important evidence relevant to the current situation around 
the globe where policy uncertainty is at a record high (Davis, 2016). 
We estimate each firm’s Brexit exposure in two alternative ways: as sensitivity of its 
stock returns to changes in the probability of a Brexit vote calculated from bookmakers’ odds 
during the referendum campaign, and as its stock price reaction to the referendum result. 
We develop our predictions on the determinants of Brexit exposure based on the 
existing literature on policy and political uncertainty and we focus on two firm characteristics: 
internationalization and growth and investment opportunities. Ex ante we propose contrary 
arguments which indicate that international operations might either reduce or increase exposure 
to Brexit. Our cross-sectional regressions provide strong and robust evidence that firms with 
greater international diversification, particularly outside the European Single Market, have a 
lower Brexit exposure. We show that the effect of foreign operations is not a pure exchange 
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rate effect (due to the weakening of the British pound) and we suggest that the moderating 
impact of foreign operations on the exposure to political uncertainty associated with Brexit 
results from multinational firms being able to diversify domestic policy risks. The evidence 
regarding growth and investment opportunities is less conclusive but we find some suggestive 
evidence that high-growth firms are more exposed to Brexit uncertainties. At the industry level, 
we find that Financials and companies in the Consumer Goods and Consumer Services sectors 
are most affected by uncertainties associated with Brexit. 
Our analysis is based on stock market data around the Brexit referendum. Follow-on 
research could provide further evidence on how individual companies are affected by Brexit-
related uncertainty when financial reporting data become available in the post-Brexit period. 
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Appendix A. Glossary of Terms Relating to Political and Economic Arrangements in Europe 
 
Name / Organization Member countries 
European Union (E.U.) Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
European Economic Area (E.E.A.) E.U. plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway 
European Single Market E.E.A. plus Switzerland 
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Table 1. Implied Probability of Leave (Brexit) Vote 
 
 Mean Std dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Probability of Leave (Brexit) Vote 0.293 0.043 0.179 0.271 0.294 0.325 0.392 
Gap between Probability and 0.50 0.207 0.043 0.108 0.175 0.206 0.229 0.321 
Change in Probability (Not Scaled) -0.001 0.022 -0.134 -0.006 0.000 0.004 0.073 
Change in Probability Scaled by Lagged Gap -0.012 0.136 -1.009 -0.030 0.000 0.021 0.323 
Change in Probability Scaled by Lagged Probability -0.001 0.072 -0.365 -0.021 0.000 0.014 0.269 
Probability of Leave (Brexit) Vote is the average implied probability from odds by Coral, Ladbrokes, Paddy Power 
and William Hill, with probabilities for individual bookmakers calculated as: 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 =
1 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒⁄
1 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒+1 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛⁄⁄
, 
where 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛) is the end of day t decimal odds offered by bookmaker j on the leave (remain) 
outcome of the referendum. Change in Probability Scaled by Lagged Gap (variable xt in subsequent tests, unless 
stated otherwise) is calculated as: 
𝑥𝑡 =
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒−𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡−1
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒
0.5−𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡−1
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 , 
where 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒  is the Probability of Leave Vote defined above. Change in Probability Scaled by Lagged 
Probability is the percentage change in the Probability of Leave Vote and is calculated as: 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒−𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡−1
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑡−1
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 . 
All variables are measured for 84 trading days between February 20, 2016, when the E.U. membership referendum 
was announced and June 22, 2016, one day before the referendum. Data on odds are sourced from Oddschecker. 
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Table 2. Brexit Beta and Market Reaction to Brexit Vote 
 
 N Mean Std dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Panel A: Brexit Beta (βBi) 
Full Sample 331 -0.025 0.035 -0.120 -0.040 -0.027 -0.014 0.431 
Basic Materials 22 -0.010 0.034 -0.100 -0.021 -0.014 0.001 0.094 
Consumer Goods 34 -0.033 0.020 -0.072 -0.052 -0.029 -0.019 0.001 
Consumer Services 82 -0.028 0.023 -0.080 -0.044 -0.029 -0.016 0.040 
Financials 49 -0.040 0.020 -0.120 -0.050 -0.040 -0.029 0.014 
Healthcare 16 0.012 0.113 -0.036 -0.026 -0.016 -0.005 0.431 
Industrials 90 -0.020 0.024 -0.059 -0.034 -0.021 -0.010 0.085 
Oil & Gas 11 -0.026 0.027 -0.099 -0.033 -0.015 -0.011 -0.006 
Technology 15 -0.024 0.023 -0.062 -0.040 -0.026 0.005 0.009 
Telecommunication 5 -0.036 0.014 -0.055 -0.041 -0.039 -0.028 -0.018 
Utilities 7 -0.033 0.010 -0.048 -0.040 -0.034 -0.025 -0.018 
Panel B: Market Reaction to Brexit Vote (BHR(0,1)i) 
Full Sample 331 -0.130 0.108 -0.471 -0.197 -0.116 -0.063 0.287 
Basic Materials 22 -0.027 0.123 -0.169 -0.095 -0.064 -0.028 0.287 
Consumer Goods 34 -0.149 0.154 -0.410 -0.310 -0.107 -0.028 0.044 
Consumer Services 82 -0.148 0.084 -0.366 -0.209 -0.154 -0.092 0.038 
Financials 49 -0.199 0.108 -0.471 -0.246 -0.187 -0.123 -0.031 
Healthcare 16 -0.045 0.080 -0.233 -0.083 -0.030 0.005 0.058 
Industrials 90 -0.126 0.085 -0.355 -0.163 -0.103 -0.068 0.012 
Oil & Gas 11 -0.067 0.060 -0.153 -0.124 -0.066 -0.037 0.030 
Technology 15 -0.125 0.088 -0.303 -0.201 -0.115 -0.080 0.009 
Telecommunication 5 -0.097 0.042 -0.145 -0.116 -0.114 -0.069 -0.039 
Utilities 7 -0.045 0.057 -0.117 -0.107 -0.021 0.006 0.018 
Panel A of this table presents descriptive statistics for βBi, the Brexit betas of individual firms, estimated from the 
model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where rit is stock i’s return on day t and xt is the scaled change in the probability of a Brexit vote on day t implied 
by bookmakers’ odds. βBi is negative where firm stock returns fall in response to an increase in the probability of 
a Brexit vote. The model is estimated over 84 trading days between February 20, 2016 and June 22, 2016. Panel 
B presents descriptive statistics for individual firms’ stock price reaction to the Brexit vote. It is measured as the 
stock buy-and-hold return on the day of the referendum result (Day 0 – June 24, 2016) and the following trading 
day (Day 1 – June 27, 2016). The sample includes all U.K. firms listed on the London Stock Exchange on January 
1, 2016, excluding Equity Investment Instruments, Non-Equity Investment Instruments, Real Estate Investment 
and Services, Real Estate Investment Trusts and the least liquid firms (firms with more than 8 zero daily returns 
between February 20, 2016 and June 22, 2016). Industries are defined according to the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB). 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
 
 N Mean Std dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Panel A: Measures of Internationalization 
Ln Foreign Country Count  297 2.901 0.857 1.099 2.197 2.996 3.497 4.736 
Europe 297 2.004 0.794 0.000 1.386 2.079 2.639 3.367 
Other 297 2.420 0.904 0.693 1.792 2.485 2.996 4.431 
Foreign Country Count (raw) 297 25 22 2 8 19 32 113 
Europe (raw) 297 9 7 0 3 7 13 28 
Other (raw) 297 16 16 1 5 11 19 83 
Foreign Sales 277 0.464 0.363 0.000 0.037 0.504 0.811 1.000 
Foreign Assets 231 0.280 0.286 0.000 0.000 0.199 0.542 0.992 
Panel B: Growth and Investment Opportunities 
MB Ratio 297 3.959 4.521 0.090 1.590 2.670 4.370 33.950 
Sales Growth 297 0.052 0.161 -0.288 -0.027 0.030 0.096 0.910 
Capex 251 0.049 0.043 0.000 0.017 0.037 0.064 0.185 
R&D Expenses 251 0.023 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.700 
R&D Dummy 251 0.406 0.492 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Panel C: Other Variables / Control Variables 
Ln Firm Size 297 7.362 1.509 3.781 6.370 7.198 8.327 11.096 
Firm Size (GBP mil) 297 5,550 12,337 44 584 1,337 4,135 65,930 
ROE 297 0.153 0.372 -0.852 0.043 0.130 0.213 2.245 
Foreign Ownership 297 0.308 0.185 0.021 0.175 0.286 0.424 0.841 
E.U. Lobbying 297 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 
Single Market Workforce 297 0.076 0.044 0.019 0.051 0.064 0.100 0.314 
Leverage 251 0.229 0.172 0.000 0.091 0.217 0.332 0.855 
Cash Holdings 251 0.082 0.082 0.000 0.028 0.059 0.100 0.492 
Ln Assets per Employee 251 -1.524 1.165 -4.075 -2.293 -1.630 -0.936 3.719 
Assets per Employee (GBP mil) 251 0.604 2.698 0.017 0.101 0.196 0.392 41.235 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in cross-sectional regressions 
employed to determine the Brexit exposure of individual firms. Ln Foreign Country Count is the natural logarithm 
of 1 plus the number of foreign countries mentioned in the firm’s most recent (2015/2016) annual report published 
before the Brexit referendum. The foreign countries are further split into European Single Market countries 
(‘Europe’) and other foreign countries. Foreign Sales is sales generated from foreign operations divided by total 
sales. Foreign Assets is assets of foreign operations divided by total assets. MB Ratio is the ratio of the year-end 
share price to book value per share. Sales Growth is the three-year change in revenues. Capex is capital 
expenditures scaled by the previous year’s total assets. R&D Expenses is research and development expenses 
scaled by total sales, and it is set to zero for missing data. R&D Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
data for research and development expenses is non-missing, and equal to zero otherwise. Ln Firm Size is the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s stock market capitalization. ROE (Return on Equity) is net income less preferred 
dividends divided by the average of current year’s and previous year’s common equity. Foreign Ownership is the 
percentage of shares outstanding held by investors located outside of the U.K. E.U. Lobbying is the midpoint of 
the range of the declared E.U. lobbying costs (converted to GBP) scaled by total sales and multiplied by 100. 
Single Market Workforce is the fraction of the workforce in the sector the firm belongs to (defined by the 2-digit 
British SIC code) born in a European Single Market country other than the U.K. Leverage is the ratio of total debt 
to total assets. Cash Holdings is cash scaled by total assets. Ln Assets per Employee is the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of total assets to the number of employees. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The 
sample is limited to companies with all data available (297 for all firms including financial firms, and 251 for 
non-financial firms), except for Foreign Sales and Foreign Assets for which the availability is lower. 
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Table 4. Determinants of Brexit Exposure 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
Brexit Beta (βBi) 
Dependent Variable: 
Market Reaction to Brexit Vote (BHR(0,1)i) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Ln Foreign Country Count 0.0049*** 0.0043** 0.0504*** 0.0458*** 
 (2.74) (2.11) (6.03) (4.92) 
MB Ratio  -0.0008** -0.0007* 0.0000 -0.0013 
 (-2.22) (-1.70) (0.03) (-0.88) 
Sales Growth -0.0015 -0.0099 -0.1270*** -0.0909** 
 (-0.15) (-1.16) (-3.20) (-1.99) 
Capex  0.0409  -0.0179 
  (0.93)  (-0.12) 
R&D Expenses  0.0070  -0.0359 
  (0.44)  (-0.51) 
R&D Dummy  0.0040  0.0345*** 
  (1.16)  (2.93) 
Ln Firm Size -0.0052*** -0.0063*** -0.0109** -0.0127*** 
 (-5.08) (-5.05) (-2.57) (-2.65) 
ROE  0.0152*** 0.0157*** 0.0032 0.0117 
 (3.41) (3.23) (0.24) (0.88) 
Foreign Ownership 0.0014 0.0070 0.0121 0.0351 
 (0.19) (0.94) (0.38) (1.06) 
E.U. Lobbying 0.2283 0.9795 1.5760 4.7482 
 (0.42) (1.31) (0.73) (1.38) 
Single Market Workforce 0.0373 0.0329 0.0169 -0.0241 
 (1.39) (1.13) (0.13) (-0.20) 
Leverage  -0.0087  0.0512 
  (-0.83)  (1.32) 
Cash Holdings  -0.0247  -0.0345 
  (-1.38)  (-0.48) 
Ln Assets per Employee  0.0009  -0.0003 
  (0.59)  (-0.06) 
Constant 0.0016 0.0099 -0.0661 -0.0930** 
 (0.19) (0.96) (-1.53) (-2.15) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 297 251 297 251 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1717 0.1443 0.3344 0.3158 
This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions of Brexit exposure on a set of firm characteristics. 
Brexit exposure is measured alternatively as the Brexit beta or the stock price reaction to the Brexit vote.  
Brexit beta (βBi) is estimated from the model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where rit is stock i’s return on day t and xt is the scaled change in the probability of a Brexit vote on day t implied 
by bookmakers’ odds. ΒBi is negative where firm returns fall in response to an increase in the probability of a 
Brexit vote. The model is estimated over 84 trading days between February 20, 2016 and June 22, 2016.  
The stock price reaction to the Brexit vote (BHR(0,1)i) is measured as the buy-and-hold return on the day of the 
referendum result (Day 0 – June 24, 2016) and the following trading day (Day 1 – June 27, 2016).  
The independent variables relate to firm characteristics and are: Ln Foreign Country Count is the natural logarithm 
of 1 plus the number of foreign countries mentioned in the firm’s most recent (2015/2016) annual report published 
before the Brexit referendum. MB Ratio is the ratio of the year-end share price to book value per share. Sales 
Growth is the three-year change in revenues. Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the previous year’s total
 (continued) 
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Table 4. – continued 
 
assets. R&D Expenses is research and development expenses scaled by total sales, and it is set to zero for missing 
data. R&D Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the data for research and development expenses is non-
missing, and equal to zero otherwise. Ln Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s stock market 
capitalization. ROE (Return on Equity) is net income less preferred dividends divided by the average of current 
year’s and previous year’s common equity. Foreign Ownership is the percentage of shares outstanding held by 
investors located outside of the U.K. E.U. Lobbying is the midpoint of the range of the declared E.U. lobbying 
costs (converted to GBP) scaled by total sales and multiplied by 100. Single Market Workforce is the fraction of 
the workforce in the sector the firm belongs to (defined by the 2-digit British SIC code) born in a European Single 
Market country other than the U.K. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash Holdings is cash scaled 
by total assets. Assets per employee is the natural logarithm of the ratio of total assets to the number of employees. 
All dependent and independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. t-statistics based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. ***, **and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Regressions (ii) and (iv) are run for non-financial firms 
only and hence have a smaller number of observations. 
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Table 5. Sources of Benefits of Internationalization 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
Brexit Beta (βBi) 
Controlling for FX Exposure 
Dependent Variable: 
Brexit Beta (βBi) 
Dependent Variable: 
Market Reaction to Brexit 
Vote (BHR(0,1)i) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Ln Foreign Country Count 0.0062*** 0.0061***     
 (3.67) (3.01)     
Ln Foreign Country Count - Europe   -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0025 -0.0019 
   (-0.06) (0.09) (-0.28) (-0.20) 
Ln Foreign Country Count - Other   0.0052*** 0.0042* 0.0537*** 0.0479*** 
   (2.65) (1.94) (6.09) (4.96) 
MB Ratio  -0.0010** -0.0011*** -0.0008** -0.0007* 0.0002 -0.0011 
 (-2.54) (-2.61) (-2.19) (-1.65) (0.12) (-0.73) 
Sales Growth 0.0038 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0089 -0.1190*** -0.0801* 
 (0.41) (-0.09) (-0.06) (-1.08) (-2.99) (-1.81) 
Capex  0.0662  0.0403  -0.0267 
  (1.41)  (0.92)  (-0.18) 
R&D Expenses  0.0177  0.0073  -0.0300 
  (1.00)  (0.46)  (-0.43) 
R&D Dummy  0.0031  0.0036  0.0347** 
  (0.92)  (1.02)  (2.57) 
Ln Firm Size -0.0057*** -0.0066*** -0.0052*** -0.0063*** -0.0110*** -0.0121*** 
 (-5.71) (-5.51) (-5.08) (-4.96) (-2.67) (-2.58) 
ROE  0.0145*** 0.0156*** 0.0152*** 0.0156*** 0.0028 0.0105 
 (2.74) (3.09) (3.38) (3.19) (0.21) (0.78) 
Foreign Ownership 0.0069 0.0108 0.0013 0.0071 0.0122 0.0366 
 (0.88) (1.34) (0.18) (0.95) (0.38) (1.12) 
E.U. Lobbying 0.3443 1.0083 0.2269 0.9644 1.6443 4.5881 
 (0.77) (1.17) (0.43) (1.34) (0.81) (1.40) 
Single Market Workforce 0.0596** 0.0533* 0.0348 0.0321 -0.0096 -0.0339 
 (2.44) (1.93) (1.30) (1.10) (-0.07) (-0.27) 
Leverage  -0.0063  -0.0094  0.0430 
  (-0.65)  (-0.88)  (1.09) 
Cash Holdings  -0.0120  -0.0245  -0.0318 
  (-0.60)  (-1.37)  (-0.45) 
Ln Assets per Employee  0.0013  0.0008  -0.0015 
  (0.79)  (0.53)  (-0.26) 
Constant 0.0133 0.0175* 0.0047 0.0127 -0.0348 -0.0623 
 (1.62) (1.72) (0.55) (1.24) (-0.88) (-1.53) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 297 251 297 251 297 251 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2483 0.2528 0.1733 0.1424 0.3506 0.3261 
Europe = Other (F-test)   1.95 0.85 13.27*** 8.84*** 
This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions of Brexit exposure on a set of firm characteristics. In 
the specifications in columns (i) and (ii) our dependent variable is measured after controlling for exchange rate 
movements, and in the specifications in columns (iii) through (vi) we include a refinement to a key independent 
variable, the foreign country count measure. 
Brexit exposure is measured alternatively as the Brexit beta or the stock price reaction to the Brexit vote.  
In columns (i) and (ii), Brexit beta (βBi) is estimated from the model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝐺𝐵𝑃𝑈𝑆𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
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where rit and xt are defined as above, and 𝑟𝑡
𝐺𝐵𝑃𝑈𝑆𝐷 is the percentage change in the GBP/USD exchange rate on 
day t.  
In columns (ii) and (iii), Brexit beta (βBi) is estimated from the model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where rit is stock i’s return on day t and xt is the scaled change in the probability of a Brexit vote on day t implied 
by bookmakers’ odds. The model is estimated over 84 trading days between February 20, 2016 and June 22, 2016. 
In columns (v) and (vi), the stock price reaction to the Brexit vote (BHR(0,1)i) is measured as the buy-and-hold 
return on the day of the referendum result (Day 0 – June 24, 2016) and the following trading day (Day 1 – June 
27, 2016).  
The independent variables relate to firm characteristics and are: Ln Foreign country count is the natural logarithm 
of 1 plus the number of foreign countries mentioned in the firm’s most recent (2015/2016) annual report published 
before the Brexit referendum. In columns (iii)-(vi) the foreign countries are split into European Single Market 
countries (‘Europe’) and other foreign countries. MB Ratio is the ratio of the year-end share price to book value 
per share. Sales Growth is the three-year change in revenues. Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the previous 
year’s total assets. R&D Expenses is research and development expenses scaled by total sales, and it is set to zero 
for missing data. R&D Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the data for research and development expenses 
is non-missing, and equal to zero otherwise. Ln Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s stock market 
capitalization. ROE (Return on Equity) is net income less preferred dividends divided by the average of current 
year’s and previous year’s common equity. Foreign Ownership is the percentage of shares outstanding held by 
investors located outside of the U.K. E.U. Lobbying is the midpoint of the range of the declared E.U. lobbying 
costs (converted to GBP) scaled by total sales and multiplied by 100. Single Market Workforce is the fraction of 
the workforce in the sector the firm belongs to (defined by the 2-digit British SIC code) born in a European Single 
Market country other than the U.K. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash Holdings is cash scaled 
by total assets. Ln Assets per Employee is the natural logarithm of the ratio of total assets to the number of 
employees. All dependent and independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. T-statistics based 
on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. The bottom row 
of the table reports F-statistics of the test for equality of coefficients of Ln Foreign country count – Europe and 
Ln Foreign country count – other. ***, **and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Regressions (ii), (iv) and (vi) are run for non-financial firms only. 
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Table 6. Determinants of Brexit Exposure – Alternative Measures of Internationalization 
 
 Dependent Variable: Brexit Beta (βBi) Dependent Variable: Market Reaction to Brexit Vote (BHR(0,1)i) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Foreign Sales 0.0086** 0.0082*   0.1073*** 0.0907***   
 (2.13) (1.81)   (6.31) (4.69)   
Foreign Assets   0.0061 0.0076   0.0747*** 0.0763*** 
   (1.16) (1.27)   (3.13) (3.00) 
MB Ratio  -0.0008** -0.0009** -0.0011** -0.0013** 0.0009 -0.0011 0.0006 -0.0014 
 (-2.15) (-2.00) (-2.04) (-1.98) (0.77) (-0.89) (0.35) (-0.78) 
Sales Growth -0.0102 -0.0141 -0.0176* -0.0230** -0.1801*** -0.1600*** -0.2136*** -0.1923*** 
 (-1.22) (-1.39) (-1.86) (-2.22) (-4.48) (-3.41) (-4.28) (-3.59) 
Capex  0.0258  0.0142  0.0247  0.1042 
  (0.63)  (0.30)  (0.15)  (0.58) 
R&D Expenses  0.0091  -0.0603***  -0.0045  0.0189 
  (0.61)  (-2.18)  (-0.09)  (0.11) 
R&D Dummy  0.0042  0.0064  0.0317**  0.0409*** 
  (1.15)  (1.43)  (2.37)  (2.69) 
Ln Firm size -0.0043*** -0.0053*** -0.0044*** -0.0052*** -0.0010 -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0012 
 (-4.42) (-4.62) (-3.97) (-4.12) (-0.27) (-0.40) (-0.25) (-0.26) 
ROE  0.0159*** 0.0173*** 0.0212*** 0.0245*** -0.0063 0.0076 -0.0097 -0.0000 
 (3.44) (3.47) (2.78) (2.88) (-0.47) (0.57) (-0.45) (-0.00) 
Foreign Ownership 0.0043 0.0075 0.0104 0.0153* 0.0279 0.0358 0.0516 0.0430 
 (0.61) (0.96) (1.26) (1.67) (0.92) (1.10) (1.50) (1.15) 
E.U. Lobbying 0.2386 1.1388 0.3658 1.3832* 1.0159 6.9909* 3.0961 9.8679** 
 (0.44) (1.50) (0.58) (1.79) (0.45) (1.95) (1.05) (2.40) 
Single Market Workforce 0.0281 0.0176 0.0394 0.0263 -0.1410 -0.2260 -0.0245 -0.1359 
 (1.07) (0.62) (1.32) (0.86) (-0.97) (-1.61) (-0.17) (-0.99) 
Leverage  -0.0072  -0.0045  0.0380  0.0785* 
  (-0.68)  (-0.35)  (0.97)  (1.83) 
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Cash Holdings  -0.0187  -0.0028  -0.0590  0.0220 
  (-1.04)  (-0.13)  (-0.83)  (0.30) 
Ln Assets per Employee  -0.0004  -0.0003  -0.0104*  -0.0036 
  (-0.29)  (-0.20)  (-1.82)  (-0.62) 
Constant 0.0043 0.0120 0.0075 0.0118 -0.0512 -0.0760 -0.0330 -0.0874** 
 (0.49) (1.18) (0.75) (1.01) (-1.38) (-1.95) (-0.78) (-2.09) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 277 239 231 201 277 239 231 201 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1881 0.1530 0.1496 0.1378 0.3466 0.3426 0.2692 0.3164 
This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions of Brexit exposure on a set of firm characteristics. In these specifications we employ alternative measures of 
internationalization.  Brexit exposure is measured alternatively as the Brexit beta or the stock price reaction to the Brexit vote.  
Brexit beta (βBi) is estimated from the model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where rit is stock i’s return on day t and xt is the scaled change in the probability of a Brexit vote on day t implied by bookmakers’ odds. βBi is negative where firm returns fall 
in response to an increase in the probability of a Brexit vote. The model is estimated over 84 trading days between February 20, 2016 and June 22, 2016. The stock price 
reaction to the Brexit vote (BHR(0,1)i) is measured as the buy-and-hold return on the day of the referendum result (Day 0 – June 24, 2016) and the following trading day (Day 
1 – June 27, 2016).  
The independent variables relate to firm characteristics and are: Foreign Sales is sales generated from foreign operations divided by total sales. Foreign Assets is assets of 
foreign operations divided by total assets. MB Ratio is the ratio of the year-end share price to book value per share. Sales Growth is the three-year change in revenues. Capex 
is capital expenditures scaled by the previous year’s total assets. R&D Expenses is research and development expenses scaled by total sales, and it is set to zero for missing 
data. R&D Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the data for research and development expenses is non-missing, and equal to zero otherwise. Ln Firm Size is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s stock market capitalization. ROE (Return on Equity) is net income less preferred dividends divided by the average of current year’s and previous year’s 
common equity. Foreign Ownership is the percentage of shares outstanding held by investors located outside of the U.K. E.U. Lobbying is the midpoint of the range of the 
declared E.U. lobbying costs (converted to GBP) scaled by total sales and multiplied by 100. Single Market Workforce is the fraction of the workforce in the sector the firm 
belongs to (defined by the 2-digit British SIC code) born in a European Single Market country other than the U.K. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash 
Holdings is cash scaled by total assets. Ln Assets per Employee is the natural logarithm of the ratio of total assets to the number of employees. All dependent and independent 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. ***, **and 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Regressions (ii), (iv), (vi) and (viii) are run for non-financial firms only. 
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Table 7. Alternative Estimates of Brexit Exposure 
 
  Mean Std dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Panel A: Alternative Estimates of Brexit Beta 
(i) 
Change in Leave Probability 
Not Scaled 
-0.164 0.206 -0.737 -0.270 -0.170 -0.091 2.263 
(ii) 
Change in Leave Probability 
Scaled by Previous Probability 
-0.048 0.057 -0.207 -0.079 -0.051 -0.027 0.567 
(iii) 
Current and Lagged Change in 
Leave Probability 
-0.030 0.039 0.158 -0.053 -0.030 -0.015 0.341 
(iv) 
Controlling for FTSE All Share 
Returns 
-0.005 0.034 -0.093 -0.021 -0.008 0.006 0.420 
(v) 
Controlling for S&P500 Returns 
and Changes in VIX 
-0.017 0.036 -0.112 -0.033 -0.020 -0.006 0.464 
Panel B: Alternative Estimates of Market Reaction to Brexit Vote 
(vi) Return Day 0 -0.067 0.068 -0.320 -0.093 -0.054 -0.023 0.170 
(vii) BHAR(0,1) CAPM-Adjusted -0.080 0.112 -0.454 -0.149 -0.068 -0.035 0.333 
(viii) 
BHAR(0,1) 
Fama-French-Adjusted 
-0.023 0.112 -0.435 -0.099 -0.016 0.049 0.540 
This table presents descriptive statistics for alternative estimates of individual firms’ Brexit betas (Panel A) and 
stock price reactions to the Brexit vote (Panel B). In rows (i) and (ii) Brexit beta is defined as βBi estimated from 
the model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where rit is stock i’s return on day t. In row (i) xt is the absolute (not scaled) change in the probability of a Brexit 
vote on day t implied by bookmakers’ odds, and in row (ii) it is scaled by the previous day’s probability 
(percentage change). In row (iii) Brexit beta is calculated as (𝛽𝐵1𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵2𝑖), estimated from the model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵1𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐵2𝑖𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where rit is stock i’s return on day t and xt is the change in the probability of a leave (Brexit) vote on day t scaled 
by the distance from 0.5 on day t-1. In row (iv) Brexit beta is defined as βBi estimated from the model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where rit is defined as above, xt is the change in the probability of a leave (Brexit) vote on day t scaled by the 
distance from 0.5 on day t-1, and 𝑟𝑡
𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸 is the return on the FTSE All Share index on day t. In row (v) Brexit beta 
is defined as βBi estimated from the model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚1𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑆&𝑃500 + 𝛽𝑚2𝑖𝑟𝑡−1
𝑆&𝑃500 + 𝛽𝑣1𝑖Δ𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽𝑣2𝑖Δ𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where rit and xt are defined as above, 𝑟𝑡
𝑆&𝑃500 is the return on the S&P500 index on day t, and Δ𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡  is the change 
in the value of the VIX index on day t. All models are estimated over 84 trading days between February 20, 2016 
and June 22, 2016. In row (vi) the stock price reaction is calculated as the stock return on the day of the referendum 
result (June 24, 2016). In rows (vii) and (viii) the stock price reaction is measured as the stock’s buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR(0,1)) calculated as the stock’s buy-and-hold return on the day of the referendum result 
(Day 0 – June 24, 2016) and the following trading day (Day 1 – June 27, 2016) less the expected buy-and-hold 
return estimated on the basis of the CAPM model or the Fama-French model, respectively. Betas of the CAPM 
and Fama-French factors are estimated using daily data over 2015. The sample includes all U.K. firms listed on 
the London Stock Exchange on January 1, 2016, excluding Equity Investment Instruments, Non-Equity 
Investment Instruments, Real Estate Investment and Services, Real Estate Investment Trusts and the least liquid 
firms (firms with more than 8 zero daily returns between February 20, 2016 and June 22, 2016). 
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Table 8. Determinants of Brexit Exposure – Alternative Estimates of Brexit Beta 
 
 Dependent Variable: Alternative Estimates of Brexit Beta 
 Change in Leave Probability 
Not Scaled 
Change in Leave Probability 
Scaled by Previous Probability 
Current and Lagged Change 
in Leave Probability 
Controlling for FTSE All 
Share Returns 
Controlling for S&P500 
Returns and Changes in VIX 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) 
Ln Foreign Country Count 0.0340*** 0.0317** 0.0103*** 0.0096** 0.0092*** 0.0091*** 0.0063*** 0.0064*** 0.0057*** 0.0056*** 
 (2.95) (2.36) (3.01) (2.41) (4.14) (3.57) (3.79) (3.28) (3.13) (2.60) 
MB Ratio  -0.0050** -0.0041 -0.0015** -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0008* -0.0009** -0.0010** -0.0007* -0.0007* 
 (-2.34) (-1.58) (-2.34) (-1.52) (-1.50) (-1.69) (-2.43) (-2.58) (-1.84) (-1.71) 
Sales Growth -0.0152 -0.0630 -0.0054 -0.0179 -0.0092 -0.0235* -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0003 -0.0083 
 (-0.24) (-1.12) (-0.30) (-1.04) (-0.77) (-1.96) (-0.03) (-0.09) (0.03) (-0.89) 
Capex  0.2016  0.0492  0.0879  0.0359  0.0464 
  (0.72)  (0.60)  (1.59)  (0.84)  (1.02) 
R&D Expenses  -0.0097  -0.0134  0.0335*  0.0045  0.0144 
  (-0.09)  (-0.43)  (1.85)  (1.26)  (0.76) 
R&D Dummy  0.0281  0.0093  0.0056  0.0045  0.0032 
  (1.25)  (1.44)  (1.18)  (1.26)  (0.95) 
Ln Firm Size -0.0297*** -0.0370*** -0.0082*** -0.0102*** -0.0065*** -0.0075*** -0.0026*** -0.0040*** -0.0052*** -0.0063*** 
 (-4.49) (-4.56) (-4.14) (-4.28) (-5.03) (-4.62) (-2.68) (-3.24) (-4.94) (-4.83) 
ROE  0.1025*** 0.1012*** 0.0317*** 0.0305*** 0.0153*** 0.0162*** 0.0110** 0.0132*** 0.0136*** 0.0150*** 
 (3.66) (3.22) (3.75) (3.22) (2.68) (2.68) (2.33) (2.84) (2.93) (3.21) 
Foreign Ownership 0.0025 0.0377 -0.0006 0.0108 0.0038 0.0098 0.0035 0.0082 -0.0012 0.0035 
 (0.05) (0.79) (-0.05) (0.76) (0.41) (1.03) (0.49) (1.10) (-0.16) (0.44) 
E.U. Lobbying 0.9854 6.1282 0.1880 1.6598 -0.4187 0.5753 0.3456 0.8819 0.2299 0.8692 
 (0.28) (1.28) (0.19) (1.18) (-0.64) (0.60) (0.73) (1.10) (0.45) (1.06) 
Single Market Workforce 0.2450 0.2335 0.0740 0.0744 0.0171 0.0030 0.0498** 0.0430* 0.0435 0.0379 
 (1.41) (1.25) (1.43) (1.35) (0.48) (0.08) (2.25) (1.79) (1.60) (1.26) 
Leverage  -0.0607  -0.0201  -0.0113  -0.0002  -0.0055 
  (-0.90)  (-1.04)  (-0.80)  (-0.02)  (-0.59) 
(continued) 
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Cash Holdings  -0.1562  -0.0407  -0.0422**  -0.0067  -0.0167 
  (-1.39)  (-1.25)  (-2.03)  (-0.36)  (-0.88) 
Ln Assets per Employee  0.0071  0.0020  0.0006  0.0009  0.0012 
  (0.78)  (0.76)  (0.31)  (0.61)  (0.73) 
Constant -0.0129 0.0400 -0.0071 0.0070 -0.0011 0.0043 -0.0040 0.0012 0.0082 0.0142 
 (-0.23) (0.61) (-0.43) (0.36) (-0.10) (0.33) (-0.48) (0.12) (0.94) (1.35) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 297 251 297 251 297 251 297 251 297 251 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1713 0.1415 0.1749 0.1456 0.1973 0.1570 0.2502 0.2641 0.1641 0.1564 
This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions of Brexit exposure on a set of firm characteristics, where Brexit exposure is represented by the Brexit beta, estimated 
using the alternative approaches set out in Panel A of Table 7. In columns (i)-(iv) Brexit exposure (βBi) is estimated from the model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where rit is stock i’s return on day t. In columns (i) and (ii) xt is the absolute (not scaled) change in the probability of a Brexit vote on day t implied by bookmakers’ odds, and 
in columns (iii) and (iv) it is scaled by the previous day’s probability (percentage change). In columns (v) and (vi) Brexit exposure is calculated as (𝛽𝐵1𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵2𝑖), estimated 
from the model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵1𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐵2𝑖𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where rit is stock i’s return on day t and xt is the change in the probability of a leave (Brexit) vote on day t scaled by the distance from 0.5 on day t-1. In columns (vii) and (viii) 
the exposure is defined as βBi estimated from the model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚1𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where rit is defined as above and xt is the change in the probability of a leave (Brexit) vote on day t scaled by the distance from 0.5 on day t-1. 𝑟𝑡
𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸  is the return on the FTSE 
All Share index on day t. In columns (ix) and (x) the exposure is defined as βBi estimated from the model: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽𝐵𝑖𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚1𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑆&𝑃500 + 𝛽𝑚2𝑖𝑟𝑡−1
𝑆&𝑃500 + 𝛽𝑣1𝑖Δ𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽𝑣2𝑖Δ𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where rit and xt are defined as above, 𝑟𝑡
𝑆&𝑃500 is the return on the S&P500 index on day t, and Δ𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡  is the change in the value of the VIX index on day t. All models are 
estimated over 84 trading days between February 20, 2016 and June 22, 2016. 
The independent variables relate to firm characteristics and are: Ln Foreign country count is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of foreign countries mentioned in the 
firm’s most recent (2015/2016) annual report published before the Brexit referendum. MB Ratio is the ratio of the year-end share price to book value per share. Sales Growth 
is the three-year change in revenues. Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the previous year’s total assets. R&D Expenses is research and development expenses scaled by 
total sales, and it is set to zero for missing data. R&D Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the data for research and development expenses is non-missing, and equal to 
zero otherwise. Ln Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s stock market capitalization. ROE (Return on Equity) is net income less preferred dividends divided by the 
average of current year’s and previous year’s common equity. Foreign Ownership is the percentage of shares outstanding held by investors located outside of the U.K. E.U. 
Lobbying is the midpoint of the range of the declared E.U. lobbying costs (converted to GBP) scaled by total sales and multiplied by 100. Single Market Workforce is the 
fraction of the workforce in the sector the firm belongs to (defined by the 2-digit British SIC code) born in a European Single Market country other than the U.K. Leverage is 
 (continued) 
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Table 8. – continued 
 
the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash Holdings is cash scaled by total assets. Ln Assets per Employee is the natural logarithm of the ratio of total assets to the number of 
employees. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the coefficients are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Regressions (ii), (iv), (vi), (viii) and (x) are run for non-financial firms only.
47 
 
Table 9. Determinants of Brexit Exposure – Alternative Estimates of Market Reaction to Brexit 
Vote 
 
 Dependent variable: Alternative Estimates of Market Reaction to Brexit Vote 
 
Return Day 0 
BHAR(0,1) 
CAPM-Adjusted 
BHAR(0,1) 
Fama-French-Adjusted 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Ln Foreign Country Count 0.0349*** 0.0309*** 0.0541*** 0.0508*** 0.0450*** 0.0412*** 
 (6.06) (4.99) (6.78) (5.76) (6.08) (4.89) 
MB Ratio  0.0008 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0023 
 (0.93) (-0.18) (0.22) (-1.09) (-0.56) (-1.23) 
Sales Growth -0.0564** -0.0568** -0.1318*** -0.0934** -0.0643* -0.0583 
 (-2.41) (-1.99) (-3.25) (-2.11) (-1.76) (-1.37) 
Capex  0.1225  -0.0153  0.0548 
  (1.47)  (-0.11)  (0.36) 
R&D Expenses  -0.0243  -0.0219  0.0416 
  (-0.54)  (-0.32)  (0.42) 
R&D Dummy  0.0217**  0.0339***  0.0132 
  (2.52)  (2.72)  (0.97) 
Ln Firm Size -0.0103*** -0.0093*** -0.0034 -0.0054 -0.0207*** -0.0220*** 
 (-3.53) (-2.92) (-0.85) (-1.21) (-5.13) (-4.49) 
ROE  -0.0089 -0.0056 -0.0050 0.0078 -0.0007 0.0112 
 (-1.02) (-0.66) (-0.36) (0.61) (-0.04) (0.48) 
Foreign Ownership 0.0090 0.0185 0.0145 0.0350 0.0260 0.0529 
 (0.43) (0.84) (0.47) (1.12) (0.76) (1.49) 
E.U. Lobbying 1.1529 3.3335* 1.8116 4.5841 0.4886 2.3161 
 (0.87) (1.96) (0.94) (1.38) (0.26) (0.85) 
Single Market Workforce 0.0509 0.0152 0.0067 -0.0291 0.0816 0.0335 
 (0.77) (0.23) (0.06) (-0.25) (0.62) (0.25) 
Leverage  0.0281  0.0679*  0.0109 
  (1.13)  (1.94)  (0.30) 
Cash Holdings  0.0261  -0.0088  -0.0429 
  (0.64)  (-0.13)  (-0.61) 
Ln Assets per Employee  0.0007  0.0005  0.0015 
  (0.19)  (0.09)  (0.25) 
Constant -0.0326 -0.0675** -0.0795** -0.1089*** 0.1050*** 0.1064*** 
 (-1.06) (-2.23) (-2.03) (-2.83) (3.28) (2.74) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 297 251 297 251 297 251 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3186 0.2956 0.4202 0.4317 0.3599 0.3368 
This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions of Brexit exposure on a set of firm characteristics, 
where Brexit exposure is represented by the stock price reaction to the Brexit vote, estimated using the alternative 
approaches set out in Panel B of Table 7. In columns (i) and (ii) the stock price reaction is calculated as the stock 
return on the day of the referendum result (June 24, 2016). In columns (iii)-(vi) the stock price reaction is the 
stock’s buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR(0,1)) calculated as the stock’s buy-and-hold return on the day of 
the referendum result (Day 0 – June 24, 2016) and the following trading day (Day 1 – June 27, 2016) less the 
expected buy-and-hold return estimated on the basis of the CAPM model (columns (iii) and (iv)) or the Fama-
French model (columns (v) and (vi)). Betas of the CAPM and Fama-French factors are estimated using daily data 
over 2015.  
The independent variables relate to firm characteristics and are: Ln Foreign country count is the natural logarithm 
of 1 plus the number of foreign countries mentioned in the firm’s most recent (2015/2016) annual report published 
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before the Brexit referendum. MB Ratio is the ratio of the year-end share price to book value per share. Sales 
Growth is the three-year change in revenues. Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the previous year’s total 
assets. R&D Expenses is research and development expenses scaled by total sales, and it is set to zero for missing 
data. R&D Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the data for research and development expenses is non-
missing, and equal to zero otherwise. Ln Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s stock market 
capitalization. ROE (Return on Equity) is net income less preferred dividends divided by the average of current 
year’s and previous year’s common equity. Foreign Ownership is the percentage of shares outstanding held by 
investors located outside of the U.K. E.U. Lobbying is the midpoint of the range of the declared E.U. lobbying 
costs (converted to GBP) scaled by total sales and multiplied by 100. Single Market Workforce is the fraction of 
the workforce in the sector the firm belongs to (defined by the 2-digit British SIC code) born in a European Single 
Market country other than the U.K. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash Holdings is cash scaled 
by total assets. Ln Assets per Employee is the natural logarithm of the ratio of total assets to the number of 
employees. All dependent and independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. t-statistics based 
on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. ***, **and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Regressions (ii), (iv) and (vi) are run for non-financial 
firms only. 
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Figure 1. Implied Probability of Leave (Brexit) Vote 
 
 
This figure presents the probability of a leave (i.e. Brexit) vote between February 22, 2016, the first trading day 
after the EU membership referendum was announced, and June 22, 2016, one day before the referendum. The 
probability is calculated as the average implied probability from odds by Coral, Ladbrokes, Paddy Power and 
William Hill, with probabilities for individual bookmakers calculated as: 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 =
1 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒⁄
1 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒+1 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛⁄⁄
, 
where 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑗𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛) is the end of day t decimal odds offered by bookmaker j on the leave (remain) 
outcome of the referendum. 
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Figure 2. Probability of Leave (Brexit) Vote and Brexit News Coverage, Opinion Polls and 
GBP/USD Exchange Rate 
 
Panel A. Probability Leave vs. Brexit News Coverage 
 
Panel B. Probability Leave vs. Remain lead in polls 
 
Panel C. Probability Leave vs. GBP/USD exchange rate 
 
This figure presents the probability of a leave (i.e. Brexit) vote implied by bookmakers’ odds plotted against the 
7-day average of Financial Times (FT.com) articles with the word ‘Brexit’ (Panel A), the percentage point lead 
of the remain vote (over the leave vote) in opinion polls (Panel B) and the GBP/USD exchange rate (Panel C). 
The opinion polls series is based on the average of the 6 most recent polls and the leave/remain support is 
calculated excluding ‘don’t knows’. 
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Figure 3. Internationalization and Market Reaction to Brexit Vote 
 
 
This figure presents performance of equally-weighted portfolios of stocks formed on the basis of quartiles of the 
distribution of Foreign Country Count (raw) - the number of foreign countries mentioned in the firm’s most recent 
(2015/2016) annual report published before the Brexit referendum. Q1 (Q4) is the portfolio of firms in the bottom 
(top) quartile of the distribution of the measure. Day 0 is the day of the referendum result (June 24, 2016). 
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